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When a lawyer faces a disciplinary grievance—whether initiated by a cli-
ent, a fellow attorney, or a third party—something, somewhere, has gone terri-
bly wrong. The attorney-client relationship has been broken or abused in a
serious way; a client may feel neglected due to an attorney’s failure to commu-
nicate, a fellow attorney may have overcome the reluctance lawyers feel to
report each other’s misconduct,1 or a third party may feel unfairly harmed by a
lawyer’s actions and accuse the lawyer of playing outside the rules. Each situa-
tion signals a profound breach of trust—trust in the attorney-client relationship,
trust in shared professional values and codes of conduct, or trust in the legal
system to govern its affairs and the actions of those who advocate within it.
Yet the processes for resolving attorney disciplinary grievances pay little
attention to the relationships that have been damaged. Instead, the organized
bar’s attorney disciplinary proceedings treat respondent lawyers in much the
same way our criminal systems treat defendants: the action is framed as a pros-
ecution, operating between the state and the defendant. Other interested parties
are only witnesses rather than active participants or decision-makers. Scuttled
aside, poorly informed about the progress of disciplinary proceedings and pow-
erless to affect them, members of the public (and sometimes even members of
the profession) can feel alienated and cynical about the legal profession’s legiti-
macy as a self-regulating entity. Thus, the process designed to remedy the
grievance actually adds insult to injury and further estranges the parties from
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1 Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor
Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 52 n.228 (2002).
[D]espite ethical obligations to report misconduct, ‘the National Organization of Bar Counsel
informed the Commission that judges and lawyers comprise a very small percentage of all com-
plainants’. . . . [A]lthough the Clark Report identified as a problem the reluctance on the part of
lawyers and judges to report instances of professional misconduct in 1970, ‘[r]eporting by law-
yers and judges of misconduct is still rare, and, in many instances, is motivated more by a desire
to disqualify opposing counsel or gain advantage in a legal matter.’
Id. (quoting ABA REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT 44, 95 (Robert B. McKay chair, 1991)).
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each other and from the legal system. Clients lose trust both in the individual
lawyers who failed them and in lawyers as a group. Third parties generalize
their anger and frustration about one unethical lawyer to the profession as a
whole.2 And attorneys themselves begin to doubt the integrity of their profes-
sional brothers and sisters.3
As James C. Turner, the Executive Director of HALT,4 sums it up:
Despite decades of calls for reform, the attorney discipline system is still badly bro-
ken . . . . [T]he vast majority of consumer complaints are not even investigated or are
dismissed on technicalities, while only a handful lead to more than a slap on the
wrist. Unscrupulous or incompetent lawyers should be held accountable to the clients
they victimize, but the current system fails to do so.5
Turner and other consumer advocates thus call for prompt investigations,
open deliberations, and effective quality control that “weeds out” unethical or
incompetent attorneys.6 These reformers are probably right that individual
attorneys and the profession as a whole cannot gain the public trust fully until
such reform is achieved.
We particularly agree that many of the woes and weaknesses of the attor-
ney disciplinary system could be mitigated through increased public participa-
tion. By making the disciplinary process more inclusive of victim perspectives
and more open to participation from multiple stake holders, attorney discipline
can combat cynicism among lawyers and the public they serve, build trust
between attorneys and their clients, and foster the professional qualities that are
captured in both the mandatory rules of professional conduct for lawyers and
the aspirational comments that accompany those rules.
Our contribution to this debate is to envision a specific structure and form
for public participation in disciplinary processes. We draw upon theory and
practice in the field of Restorative Justice. Developed primarily in the context
of criminal and juvenile justice, Restorative Justice7 animates diversionary pro-
2 According to a 2003 CNN/USA Today Gallup poll, eighty-four percent of Americans do
not think lawyers have “high ethical standards.” How Accountable is the Civil Justice Sys-
tem?, HALT, http://www.halt.org/about_halt/press_room/pdf/HALT_Statistics.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2012). The National Law Journal reports that sixty-nine percent of Americans
think lawyers value making money more than serving individual clients. Id.
3 A majority of lawyers surveyed by the Connecticut Bar Association in 2005 thought that
“the public does not perceive them to have high ethical standards”  and a third of them
believed that business and economic pressures would lead to a decline in ethical standards
and practices among lawyers. TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSION, CONN. BAR
ASS’N, SURVEY REPORT 3 (2006), available at https://www.ctbar.org/userfiles/Committees/
FutureOfTheProfession/Survey_Report.pdf.
4 HALT is a consumer advocacy organization founded in 1978 that seeks to “challenge the
legal establishment to improve access and reduce costs in our civil justice system at both the
state and federal levels.” See About HALT, HALT, http://www.halt.org/about_halt/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 1, 2012). HALT has taken particular aim at the attorney disciplinary system, issuing
the HALT “Report Card” to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each state’s system.
5 2002 Lawyer Discipline Report Card, HALT, http://www.halt.org/reform_projects/law-
yer_accountability/report_card/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (emphasis added) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
6 2006 Lawyer Discipline Report Card, HALT, http://www.halt.org/reform_projects/law-
yer_accountability/report_card_2006/index_2.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
7 See infra Section II for a more detailed description of Restorative Justice Theory and the
practices it has spawned.
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grams such as victim offender mediation,8 conferencing,9 and sentencing cir-
cles10 and emphasizes two important elements that are currently undervalued in
attorney discipline: 1) deliberation and decision making by a diverse group of
stakeholders and 2) discussion that focuses on repairing the damage caused by
the offender. A restorative approach sees “that ‘justice’ can only be realized
when the stakeholders most directly affected by a specific offence—the victim,
the offender and the community—have the opportunity to voluntarily work
through the consequences of the offence with the emphasis on repairing the
harm and damage done.”11 In our view, the legal profession both constitutes
and creates community. By strengthening that community, a more restorative
disciplinary process can in turn improve the morale of practicing lawyers, pre-
vent ethical misconduct, and protect the public.12
We envision a conversation that could take place between a lawyer facing
discipline and the bar, acting through the state’s chief disciplinary counsel.
Unlike existing disciplinary processes, however, this more restorative approach
would open the conversation to the complaining client, attorney, or third party
as well. In some cases, the group of stakeholders could be even larger,
expanding to include members of the victim’s family or support network, mem-
bers of the attorney’s family, law partners of the attorney, therapists who might
be treating the attorney in an ongoing way, and even the attorney’s malpractice
8 Victim offender mediation, administered by prosecutors, probation officers, or cooperating
private agencies, allows offenders in criminal cases to mediate with their victims, sometimes
in lieu of trial or as part of sentencing. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of
Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994)
(offering a general description and critique of victim offender mediation).
9 Conferencing is very similar to victim offender mediation, because it also gives the victim
and offender an opportunity to talk at length about the crime and its consequences. See Trish
Stewart, Family Group Conferences with Young Offenders in New Zealand, in FAMILY
GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE 66–73 (Joe Hudson et al.,
eds., 1996). Conferencing expands the conversation to include other stakeholders, including
families, community support groups, police, social welfare agency employees, and attorneys.
Id.
10 Sentencing circles, often convened pursuant to state statute, can bring together the victim
and perpetrator of a crime, the victim’s family members or other supportive persons, the
offender’s family members or other supportive persons, law enforcement officials or the
prosecutor, other criminal justice system professionals, and members of the community to
discuss the crime and its impact, to support the victim, to determine an appropriate sanction
for the offender, and to devise “methods for reintegrating the offender into community life.”
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.775 (2009); see also State v. Pearson, 637 N.W.2d 845 (Minn.
2002) (trial court properly followed sentencing circle’s recommended sanction when the
state agreed as part of the plea agreement that the case would be sent to sentencing circle for
recommended disposition—even if the trial court could not properly impose that sentence
independent of sentencing circle’s actions).
11 Eugene McLaughlin et al., Introduction: Justice in the Round—Contextualizing Restora-
tive Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES 1, 9–10 (Eugene McLaughlin et al.
eds., 2003).
12 Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1687, 1692–93 (1997) (recognizing a tension between a “private ordering” aspect of media-
tion (which allows parties to articulate their own values and adopt consistent resolutions) and
a “community enhancing” aspect that uses mediation to encourage individuals to order their
activities and resolve their disputes according to the norms of some relevant community).
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insurer. Some violations might call for still other stakeholders to be included in
the conference because flexibility and attention to specific community charac-
teristics are hallmarks of restorative justice. In short, the conversation would
include all who would support the lawyer in her attempts to repair the harm she
caused in the past, as well as those who will help her comply with professional
standards in the future.
In this conversation, the participants would talk about what went wrong,
how the attorney behaved incompetently or unethically, and the impact this had
on the other party or parties. The aim would be to let the lawyer hear and
understand the consequences of her actions.13 The conversation would then
turn to determining the form of discipline to impose. Restitution, substance
abuse treatment, or service—to the harmed individual or to the community—
could all be on the table. More traditional forms of discipline, such as repri-
mand, admonition, or limitations on the attorney’s future practice, could also be
part of the agreement.14
The “restorative discipline” we envision is both promising and paradoxi-
cal. The promise, of course, lies in all the virtues we have outlined above. The
paradox is in the very phrase, restorative discipline, an oxymoron in the view
of some restorative justice theorists. Granted, when discipline is framed only as
punishment, it cannot be truly restorative. Any process that focuses exclusively
on the defendant’s wrong and the state’s punitive response to that wrong will
fail to reach restorative goals. But the apparent paradox in the phrase restora-
tive discipline is easily resolved. What is required is greater focus on the funda-
mental meaning of “discipline,” a word that connotes a rich set of traditions,
with strong emphasis on concepts of growth, development, and education.15
13 As is true for criminal cases, this process only works if the lawyer admits the wrong. This
is not an adjudicative process to determine whether the lawyer violated the rules. It would
work as a diversionary process in cases where the lawyer admits guilt, or where an ethics
panel has adjudicated guilt, and the lawyer is willing to admit that guilt for purposes of
determining the discipline to be imposed.
14 We will later consider whether disciplinary conferences could be used in cases of more
serious misconduct, where suspension or disbarment will also be necessary. See infra at Part
II.E.1.c. It should be remembered, however, that when disbarment, suspension, probation or
reprimand is imposed, they must be made public. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT R. 10(D) (2002). Admonition, in effect only a warning, can be issued “[o]nly
in cases of minor misconduct, when there is little or no injury to a client, the public, the legal
system, or the profession, and when there is little likelihood of repetition by the lawyer.” Id.
R. 10(A)(5). The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized discipline as “quasi criminal” and
says that certain but not all due process requirements apply, including the requirement of fair
notice of the charges. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1968).
15 One dictionary defines discipline as follows:
1. Training expected to produce a specific character or pattern of behavior, especially training
that produces moral or mental improvement. 2. Controlled behavior resulting from disciplinary
training; self-control. 3a. Control obtained by enforcing compliance or order. b. A systematic
method to obtain obedience: a military discipline. c. A state of order based on submission to
rules and authority: a teacher who demanded discipline in the classroom. 4. Punishment
intended to correct or train. 5. A set of rules or methods, as those regulating the practice of a
church or monastic order. 6. A branch of knowledge or teaching.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 515 (4th ed. 2006)
(emphasis omitted).
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Our analysis remains mindful that the word discipline derives from disciple,
suggesting a core of instruction and shared values.
The seeming paradox in restorative discipline is also quickly resolved
from a practical perspective. Although most states model attorney disciplinary
processes on criminal prosecution, the states do not see punishment as a pri-
mary or even legitimate goal of attorney discipline. Rather, states discipline
attorneys in order to protect the public and maintain high quality in the practic-
ing bar.16 The system also has therapeutic goals, working to keep attorneys on
the straight and narrow and guide those who stray back to the right path.
Indeed, some states recognize no such thing as permanent disbarment, sug-
gesting that all lawyers, no matter how heinous their offenses, are theoretically
capable of redemption and reintegration. Such underlying goals and values in
the disciplinary system make it amenable to restorative justice theory and prac-
tice; indeed, given these clearly articulated values, the case for applying restor-
ative justice is even stronger in the context of attorney discipline than in
criminal justice.17
This Article proceeds in several steps. In Section I we describe attorney
discipline and some of the procedural variety that exists state to state. This
section’s purpose is not to present a complete survey of disciplinary processes
(though given the diversity that our state-based system allows, such a survey
would be useful).18 Instead, this section will give an overview of grievances
against attorneys, the standard processes (as well as some innovative programs)
states use to resolve those complaints, and the shortcomings of these systems.
Section II will introduce an alternative approach, transplanting the theory and
practice of restorative justice to the new and fertile ground of attorney disci-
pline. We will provide an introduction to Restorative Justice Theory (“RJT”)
and describe some of the ways Restorative Practices have been used in criminal
law, juvenile justice, and school disciplinary cases. Section II will conclude
16 Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Impos-
ing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1998) (citations omitted)
(“Three reasons are typically cited for imposing discipline on lawyers: first and foremost,
protection of the public, second, protection of the administration of justice and third, preser-
vation of confidence in the legal profession.” (footnotes omitted)); see also ABA JOINT
COMM. ON PROF’L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, 1.1 cmt.
(1986 & Supp. 1992); Shelley Lambert & Alexandra Sorota, Current Developments, Driving
on the Wrong Side of the Road: How Lawyers are Sanctioned for Vehicular Homicide in
New York and the District of Columbia, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 865, 865 (2002).
17 Although restorative justice theory developed in the context of criminal justice, the exis-
tence of community and shared values is far less clear in such contexts than in the relatively
homogenous and tightly knit structure of lawyers’ professional organizations. See Brown,
supra note 8, at 1292–94; Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small
World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 556 (1992) (restorative theories of
criminal justice focus on “social ceremonies of reintegrative shaming that induce moral
behavior through loving guilt,” but are “circular” because they leave readers “working back-
ward to imagine transforming American culture into something that can fulfill this daunting
task.”).
18 Cf. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, 2007 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE
SYSTEMS (2007) [hereinafter ABA 2007 SURVEY] , available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/discipline/07-full.authcheckdam.pdf (collecting statistics on
such matters as agency caseload, sanctions imposed, case processing, and staffing issues, but
not collecting descriptions of the processes states use to obtain these results).
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with design suggestions for incorporating restorative theory and practice into
attorney disciplinary processes. Section III will then consider the pros and cons
of this approach, attempting to anticipate and answer the objections likely to be
leveled at our proposal. We will conclude by defending our claim that the legal
profession is—or can be—a community, and that restorative practices in attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings could help to strengthen that community.
I. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW
Several studies have evaluated the processes used to resolve complaints
against attorneys, and all have reported rather dismal findings. For example, in
2007, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) completed its most recent Survey
on Lawyer Discipline Systems.19 The ABA sent a questionnaire to fifty-six law-
yer disciplinary agencies and compiled the results by jurisdiction.20 This ABA
study found that the nation had approximately 1.4 million lawyers with active
licenses in 2007, and during that year 117,598 disciplinary complaints were
filed against attorneys.21 Despite (or perhaps because of) the large number of
complaints filed, the vast majority led to no discipline or to informal discipline
in the form of private sanctions.22 Although disciplinary agencies in the United
States received 117,598 complaints in 2007, in that same year only 4,782 law-
yers were charged with disciplinary violations.23
With an overload of complaints in each jurisdiction, disciplinary agencies
were unable to fully investigate and resolve every complaint. For example,
Michigan’s disciplinary authority received 3,293 complaints in a state with
37,668 lawyers, but only 686 of these reached even the investigative phase.24
What could explain the fact that less than twenty-five percent of the complaints
filed against attorneys were even investigated? It could be any number or com-
bination of causes: administrative overload, institutional inefficiency, or the
failure of many complaints to allege sufficient wrongdoing to justify investiga-
tion. Many complaints in Michigan were summarily dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. Whatever the cause, this low response rate makes the disciplinary




21 Id. at Chart 1.
22 Id.
23 Id. It is difficult to determine what percentage of the complaints these charges represent,
since the ABA oddly chooses to ask disciplinary authorities how many total complaints they
receive, and how many lawyers they charge, and some lawyers undoubtedly face multiple
complaints (so that a larger percentage of the total complaints are resulting in prosecutions
than might at first appear).
24 Id.; see also James C. Turner & Suzanne M. Mishkin, Time for a Whupping: Across the
Country, Attorney Discipline Systems Disgrace the Profession, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18,
2003, available at http://www.halt.org/about_halt/in_the_news/pdf/turner-legal-times-08-18-
03.pdf (reporting that fewer than half of the attorney disciplinary complaints filed in the
District of Columbia reached investigation).
25 ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER REGULATION
FOR A NEW CENTURY at xx (1992).
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So much for the dismal overview. How do attorney disciplinary cases
appear up close? A key point for us is that quasi-criminal allegations justifying
the prosecutorial structure of attorney discipline—and here we’re imagining
lawyers who lie and deliberately cheat their clients, the courts, or third par-
ties—actually arise in relatively few disciplinary cases.26 Instead, when we
examine the body of disciplinary complaints filed against lawyers each year, a
pattern of much less deliberate wrongdoing emerges: most cases involve some
combination of the lawyer’s addiction or mental illness, sloppy business prac-
tices, mismanagement of cases, or failure to communicate.27 Thus, much of the
misconduct brought before disciplinary bodies arises from economic, structural,
and even personal forces that seem to be out of the lawyer’s control; the law-
yer’s intent may often be to do right, but case load, addiction, or inadequate
resources and administrative support drive the lawyer into neglect or misman-
agement of client matters. When misconduct does not arise from deliberate or
calculated wrongdoing, a system modeled on criminal justice and its require-
ment of mens rea may simply be barking up the wrong tree. The “forum,” to
borrow a phrase from Professor Frank Sander, does not fit the “fuss.”28 Much
of lawyer misconduct, we argue, lends itself far more readily to a therapeutic
and supportive structure than a punitive one.
The most common complaints against lawyers include a failure to commu-
nicate with the client and neglect of the client’s matters. For example, in Con-
necticut the most common offenses alleged from July 2002 to June 2003 were:
“neglect (397), lack of communication (237), excessive fee (79), misrepresenta-
26 In the state of Washington, for example, fewer than half of the cases in which discipline
was actually imposed involved “dishonesty,” “trust account/theft,” or “criminal conduct,”
and one might reasonably infer that cases resulting in discipline contain a higher concentra-
tion of such allegations than the general run of complaints. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N,
2010 LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2010), available at www.wsba.org
(search for “2010 lawyer discipline system annual report”). [hereinafter WASHINGTON DISCI-
PLINE ANNUAL REPORT]; see also id. at 9 (Washington Office of Disciplinary Counsel
received 2,739 new matters; 1,938 were written grievances and an additional 801 matters
were oral grievances alleging non-communication and disputes over the clients’ files.).
27 See Cydney Batchelor, Disciplinary Actions: When Bad Things Happen to Good Law-
yers, GPSOLO, Oct./Nov. 2006, at 48, 49.
After 15 years as a State Bar of California prosecutor, I have become completely convinced that
the discipline imposed against attorneys by their licensing boards arises at least 80 percent to 85
percent of the time from the failure of attorneys to document the work they do, their marginal
business skills, and their failure to respond appropriately when a disciplinary complaint is lodged
against them. Only a very small percentage of legitimate complaints arise from intentional mal-
feasance by the attorney . . . .
Id.; MICHAEL A. BEDKE & JOHN W. KEEGAN, AM. BAR ASS’N YOUNG LAWYERS DIV.,
COMM’N ON IMPAIRED ATTORNEYS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ¶ I (1995) (“Find-
ings from California and Georgia estimate that 60 [percent] to 80 [percent] of lawyer disci-
pline cases are the result of addiction.”); Alcohol, Drugs, and other Addictions: Do I Have a
Problem?, STATE BAR OF WIS., http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Sub-
stance_abuse_and_gambling (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (referring to a “recent report of the
ABA” which found that “more than 50 percent of all disciplinary cases involve impaired
lawyers”).
28 See generally Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss:
A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994).
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tion (66) and conflict of interest (55).”29 According to an annual report of
Maryland’s Attorney Grievance Commission, more disciplinary actions were
taken for incompetent representation (including lack of communication, lack of
diligence, neglect, and failure to abide by the client’s decisions) than for any
other violation.30 Similarly, in Michigan most disciplinary orders were due to
problems concerning neglect (including lack of communication, lack of dili-
gence, and incompetent representation).31 Other states follow suit.32
These complaints are disproportionately made against solo or small firm
practitioners.33 This higher claim rate appears to stem not from any inherent
lack of ethics in solo and small firm practitioners, but rather from challenges
that are specific to small scale practice: a client base composed primarily of
individuals rather than institutions, lower average hourly billing rates, and a
higher volume of clients to balance lower rates.34 An unsustainable business
model may take a lawyer in over his head, where he cannot stay on top of client
matters or maintain appropriate contact and communication with clients.35
In addition to the size and type of practice involved, several personal fac-
tors can increase the likelihood that a lawyer will face discipline. Experts have
estimated that lawyers suffer from depression at a higher rate than the national
average, with alcoholism and alcohol abuse within the legal profession as high
as eighteen to twenty percent.36 Lawyers battling substance abuse, gambling
addictions, or “untreated depression spiral downward into a nightmare of unat-
tended cases and dissatisfied clients . . . unable to concentrate, complete
29 Quintin Johnstone, Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Laws and Some Options for Their
Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 303, 327 n.146 (2004); see also Minn. Office of Lawyers Prof’l
Responsibility, Complaints and Investigations, http://lprb.mncourts.gov/complaints/Lawyer
ComplaintDocs/Complaint%20Brochure%20-%20English.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2012)
(listing common problems such as “neglect and delay,” “getting your file back,” “money and
accounting,” and “conflicts of interest”).
30 ATT’Y GRIEVANCE COMM’N OF MD., 36TH ANNUAL REPORT (2011).
31 STATE OF MICH. ATT’Y DISCIPLINE BD., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT app. B, available at http:/
/www.adbmich.org/download/2003_annualrpt.pdf.
32 For example, in Minnesota, of the 83 files opened in 2003, neglect and non-communica-
tion were the most numerous violations. LAWYERS’ PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY BD. OF MINN.,
ANNUAL REPORT (2004), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Documents/
2004%20Annual%20Report.pdf. In Virginia the most common complaint was failure to
communicate. VA. STATE BAR, 65TH ANNUAL REPORT: REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF BAR
COUNSEL Chart 4 (2003), available at http://www.vsb.org/anreport/02-03/.
33 Mark Hansen, Picking on the Little Guy: Perception Lingers that Discipline Falls Hard-
est on Solos, Small Firms, A.B.A. J., March 2003, at 30, 30–32 (explaining studies from
California, New Mexico, Virginia, and Oregon show higher rates of sanctions imposed
against solo and small firm practitioners); Hal R. Lieberman, How to Avoid Common Ethics
Problems: Small Firms and Solos Are Often Subject to Disciplinary Complaints and Mal-
practice Claims, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at S4.
34 See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 310, 345 (2004).
35 See id. at 324, 345. Solo practitioners, especially, are subject to this problem. See TASK
FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, CONN. BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT 13–18
(2006), available at https://www.ctbar.org/userfiles/Committees/FutureOfTheProfession/
Final_Report.pdf. (outlining the challenges small and solo firms face in establishing a viable
business model).
36 J. Robert Turnbull Jr., Lawyers Helping Lawyers: Help When You Need It, S.C. LAW.,
Sept./Oct. 2002, at 15.
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research, prepare documents or briefs, return calls or meet clients and attend
hearings.”37 Thus, the grievances regarding neglect and lack of communication
begin.
Consider a prototypical case. A solo practitioner, John Wilson, has a
diverse practice, including everything from wills and trusts, to real estate mat-
ters, to plaintiffs’ personal injury cases, but he is struggling to make ends meet.
Tom Taylor retains Wilson to represent him in a small commercial case against
a supplier who delivered defective goods to Taylor’s small business. Wilson
files the initial complaint, but then loses track of the case in the whirlwind of
developing his practice and maintaining the many other matters he is handling.
Wilson fails to return several calls from Taylor checking on the status of the
case. Then the case is dismissed due to Wilson’s failure to comply with the
defendant’s discovery request. Wilson never informs Taylor of the dismissal.
From other sources, Taylor eventually learns of the status of his case. Since the
statute of limitations has not run, Taylor retains a new lawyer to file a timely
and successful motion to reopen the case.
Still, Taylor is extremely upset with Wilson, and feels that Wilson should
not be permitted to go on as he has in ways that could harm other clients (ones
who may not be as lucky as Taylor was, retaining the ability to bring his case
with a new lawyer). Taylor files a complaint against Wilson with the state’s
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Under these facts, disci-
plinary counsel will easily have probable cause to allege that Wilson violated
the state’s Rules of Professional Conduct regarding diligence and communica-
tion. But the allegations are unlikely to rise to the level of “serious miscon-
duct,” and the processes that could be used to resolve Taylor’s complaint are
varied, from traditional grievance hearings to alternative dispute resolution
processes such as discipline by consent, diversion programs, mediation, and
arbitration. As such, numerous outcomes could arise.
A. Grievance Hearings
Most jurisdictions conduct standard adversarial hearings to resolve griev-
ance complaints. While the details differ from state to state, the ABA’s Model
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement describe a structure for this pro-
cess.38 Appendix A describes the ABA model process in detail.
A notable feature of the traditional grievance procedure is the complain-
ant’s limited role throughout the process. Having filed a grievance, the com-
plainant loses all control of the matter, often with highly dissatisfying results.
As comments to The Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement con-
cede, it is not unusual for complaints to be dismissed immediately: “Single
instances of minor neglect or minor incompetence, while technically violations
of the rules of professional conduct, are seldom treated as such. These com-
plaints are almost always dismissed. Summary dismissal of these complaints is
one of the chief sources of public dissatisfaction with the system.”39
37 Joan Newman, Montana Attorneys Must Look Into the Darkness That Plagues Them,
MONT. LAW., May 2003, at 28.
38 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11 (2002).
39 Id. R. 11 cmt.
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Even when the grievance survives summary dismissal, the complainant is
likely to feel unhappy with both the outcome and the process. To begin with,
the rules do not require the respondent or disciplinary counsel to send a copy of
the respondent’s answer to the complainant. One might see some irony in the
fact that a client complaining about lack of communication should find that the
very process designed to respond to his complaint actually continues the
offense. Nor is the complainant entitled to updates as the case progresses
through the system.
If the grievance avoids summary dismissal,40 the period of investigation
will undoubtedly feel interminable for many complainants. The average time
from filing a grievance to final disposition runs more than a year in many
states; in some states the average is more than 3 years.41 During this time,
disciplinary counsel ordinarily does not inform the complainant about the pro-
gress of the case.
Even when the complainant is a third party rather than a former client,42
the formal hearing process may be very alienating. Granted, these complainants
do not suffer the breach of trust and loss of relationship that a former client
does, but they may lose faith in lawyers generally. Though very few people
have personal encounters with the attorney disciplinary system, the word seems
to spread: one poll found that fewer than one third of respondents had confi-
dence in the integrity of lawyers’ self-regulation.43 If complainants receive
inadequate regard or compensation from the disciplinary system, they may lose
faith in legal processes more generally. The effects of this are not good for
lawyers or for the legal profession, but the negative impact is even greater and
more widespread if it leads to reduced faith in the rule of law.
If and when a formal hearing begins,44 the complainant is likely to feel
confused and overwhelmed. The respondent attorney has an obvious advantage
based on his understanding of hearings, presentation of evidence, and cross-
examination. While the respondent will often be represented by counsel, the
complainant is likely to attend the hearing alone. The complainant might be
called to testify by the prosecuting disciplinary counsel and be subject to cross
examination by the respondent’s lawyer, but at no point in the hearing does the
complainant have an opportunity to present her testimony as elicited by her
40 Recall that in some jurisdictions there is only a twenty-five percent chance that the case
will get this far. See ABA 2007 SURVEY supra note 18, at Chart I.
41 2006 Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 6 (“Of the states that did report on the
pace of their case processing, the average jurisdiction took nine months just to bring charges
against an attorney and an additional five months to impose sanctions. Louisiana, the
nation’s most inefficient disciplinary body, took an astonishing fourty-five months—nearly
four years!—to file formal charges in the average case.”).
42 See WASHINGTON DISCIPLINE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 9 (showing that approx-
imately fifty percent of disciplinary complaints are filed by current or former clients; the
other half are filed by opposing clients, lawyers, judges, other lawyers, the bar association,
and “other” complaintants).
43 DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
158 (2000); J. Thomas Greene, The Practice of Law: Gamesmanship-Commercial Enter-
prise-Noble Profession, 206 F.R.D. 312, 323 n.2 (2001).
44
“In 2000, 114,000 complaints were filed against the nation’s 1.2 million lawyers. Of
those, only 3.5 percent led to formal discipline, and just 1 percent resulted in disbarment.”
Turner & Mishkin, supra note 24.
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own attorney; she is a witness for the prosecution, not a party entitled to put on
evidence of her own.
Meanwhile, the respondent has no incentive to admit his shortcomings or
address the pain he has caused the complainant. Instead, the respondent will be
driven to make as compelling an argument as possible to deny any violations.
Throughout the process, it is unlikely that the respondent and the complainant
will ever have the opportunity to engage in conversation. Thus, as is often the
case, a formal, adversary structure designed to get at the truth will make some
truth hard to discover. As Carrie Menkel-Meadow argues, “Binary, opposi-
tional presentations of facts in dispute are not the best way for us to learn the
truth; polarized debate distorts the truth, leaves out important information, sim-
plifies complexity, and obfuscates rather than clarifies.”45 Ultimately, the hear-
ing committee resolves the matter, and the committee is not even obligated to
send a copy of its decision to the complainant.46 Thus, the traditional hearing
process fails to achieve the goals of a lawyer discipline system: “first and fore-
most, protection of the public, second, protection of the administration of jus-
tice and third, preservation of confidence in the legal profession.”47
Let us return to our hypothetical grievance by Taylor against Wilson. If
the state bar uses the formal hearing process to resolve Taylor’s complaint, the
case may go nowhere. Disciplinary counsel is likely to characterize the matter
as minor neglect and minor incompetence, resulting in summary dismissal
because the statute of limitations has not run on Taylor’s case and he retains the
ability to sue his supplier with a new lawyer. Attorney Wilson’s conduct,
though inconsiderate, disrespectful, and violative of the state’s ethics rules,
may not justify the resources required for a formal hearing. Even if the case
were to proceed far enough for a sanction to be imposed, it would probably be
no more severe than a reprimand, perhaps privately imposed, with no notice to
Taylor.48 The disciplinary authority might order Wilson to refund some of the
attorney’s fees Taylor paid (or waive the fees if still owing). But in the vast
majority of cases, bar authorities are unlikely to take any action specifically to
improve the future performance of the attorney.
Consider the impact of this process on the complainant, the former client
of this lawyer who has run afoul of the rules. Taylor has lost his relationship
with Wilson, a person he trusted. Feeling ill-used by the disciplinary system,
Taylor’s faith in the legal system may be eroded: he might reasonably suppose
that a profession unable to regulate itself effectively is unlikely to do a better
job in other realms. Indeed, Taylor is likely to feel as many crime victims do:
[U]nhappy about their lack of a legitimate role in the processing of their cases
beyond that of witness for the prosecution, the lack of opportunity to be consulted
45 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Mul-
ticultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
46 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(D) (2002).
47 Levin, supra note 16, at 17–18 (footnotes omitted).
48 2006 Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 6 (“In the average jurisdiction, only 7.8
percent of investigations yield public discipline. Almost half of the sanctions take the form
of private discipline, rendered behind closed doors.”). But see Levin, supra note 16, at 73
n.329 (“Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, and West Virginia do not impose
private discipline.”).
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about the progress of their cases, the lack of recognition of the emotional, as well as
material, harm they have experienced, and the lack of fairness and respect they
receive at the hands of the justice system as a whole.49
As lawyers like Wilson continue to practice unchecked, the administration
of justice suffers along with the public’s confidence in the profession.
B. Current Alternative Processes Meant to Reform Attorney Discipline
In 1970, the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement (“Clark Committee”) studied lawyer disciplinary procedures
nationwide.50 In its report the Clark Committee highlighted numerous faults
throughout the system, such as the secretive operation of disciplinary agencies
and the institutional bias that results when lawyers control the system without
oversight by judges or lay people.51 The Clark Committee also found that disci-
plinary agencies lacked appropriate procedures to easily dispose of minor mat-
ters, such as client neglect and failures to keep clients informed.52
Twenty years later, in 1991, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disci-
plinary Enforcement (“McKay Commission”) noted considerable improve-
ments when it reviewed attorney disciplinary processes.53 Nevertheless, several
points in the McKay Commission’s report echoed themes of the Clark report
twenty years before. “The McKay Commission recommended a fully open dis-
ciplinary process—opening up complaints from the moment they are filed,
making hearings open to the public, increasing public representation on griev-
ance panels, abolishing the gag rule on complainants, and getting rid of private
reprimands.”54 The McKay Commission also suggested that the scope of judi-
cial review be “expanded to cover the thousands of complaints that are rou-
tinely dismissed each year.”55 To expedite the processing of minor complaints,
the Commission recommended “a multi-door system of lawyer regulation
which [would] afford[ ] a variety of responses to the needs of the public and the
profession in addressing these problems.”56 Several jurisdictions responded
with reforms such as discipline by consent, consumer protection models, and
diversion programs using mediation or arbitration.
1. Discipline by Consent
In response to public dissatisfaction with so many summary dismissals,
negotiated settlements between disciplinary counsel and the respondent were
instituted as a means of resolving complaints without the expense of a formal
hearing. According to the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement,
49 Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18 (footnotes omitted).
50 ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1, 1 (1970).
51 Id. at 1–2.
52 Id. at 92–96.
53 ABA REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT iii
(Robert B. McKay chair, 1991) [hereinafter, MCKAY COMMISSION REPORT].
54 Deborah M. Chalfie, Dumping Discipline: A Consumer Protection Model for Regulating
Lawyers, 4 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 4, 11 (1991).
55 MCKAY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at v.
56 Id.
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“A lawyer against whom formal charges have been made may tender to disci-
plinary counsel a conditional admission to the petition or to a particular count
thereof in exchange for a stated form of discipline.”57 Once the disciplinary
counsel and the respondent have worked out their agreement, the respondent
must present an affidavit to the board.58 The affidavit must state that the attor-
ney freely consents to the specified form of discipline, that the lawyer is aware
of allegations providing grounds for discipline, that the facts alleged are true,
and that the lawyer could not successfully defend against these allegations if
prosecuted.59 After the affidavit has been submitted, the board may approve or
reject the conditional admission of violation.60 The court then must finally
approve or reject the discipline if it involves suspension, disbarment, or transfer
to disability/inactive status.61
The commentary to the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforce-
ment suggests that disposing of a grievance in this way is often in the mutual
best interest of the public and disciplinary agencies. “The public is immediately
protected from further misconduct by the lawyer, who otherwise might con-
tinue to practice until a formal proceeding is concluded. The agency is relieved
of the time-consuming and expensive necessity of prosecuting a formal pro-
ceeding.”62 Due to these advantages, most states have adopted provisions
allowing negotiated settlements between disciplinary counsel and the respon-
dent. Though the titles of the parties differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the
underlying content of the process remains basically the same.
Connecticut’s approach to discipline by consent is closely aligned with the
terminology of the Model Rules. According to Connecticut Practice Book § 2-
82, “The disciplinary counsel shall review the complaint and the conditional
admission, shall determine the sanctions to which the respondent may be sub-
ject, and shall discuss and may negotiate a disposition of the complaint with the
respondent or, if the respondent is represented by an attorney, with the respon-
dent’s attorney.”63 When this section became effective in 2004, the judicial
branch of the state supported it for reasons similar to those expressed in the
commentary of the Model Rules.64 The bar has warmly received structures for
negotiated settlements in disciplinary cases.
However, negotiated settlements between the respondent and disciplinary
counsel have disadvantages as well as advantages. According to the rules, the
complainant is left out of the process entirely. In fact, the complainant is not
even mentioned in most of the rules describing the process for such a settle-
57 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 21(A) (2002).
58 Id. R. 21(D).
59 Id.
60 Id. R. 21(A).
61 Id.
62 Id. R. 21 cmt.
63 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK (REVISION OF 1998) § 2-82 (2011).
64 William J. Sullivan, Chief Justice of the Conn. Supreme Court, Remarks at Connecticut
Bar Association Annual Meeting (June 7, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.jud.ct.
gov/external/news/Speech/Sullivan-CBA-04.htmlhttp://www.jud.ct.gov/external/news/
Speech/Sullivan-CBA-04.html) (Allowing negotiated discipline, as requested by “many
attorneys who appeared at the hearings held by the commission, will help to reduce the
potential for delay and expense in the disposition of many complaints.”).
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ment; in most cases she will not even receive notice of the grievance out-
come.65 Excluding the party who initiated the complaint certainly does not help
to increase public satisfaction with the grievance process. Disciplinary coun-
sel’s experience with and exposure to a wide array of complaints may allow
him to identify certain cases as particularly easy to dispose of by negotiated
settlement, but the factors that lead to that conclusion are unlikely to include
the feelings, suggestions, or opinions of the complainant. Negotiated settle-
ments may thus take on a boilerplate quality, reflecting little or no attention to
the individual complainants, respondents, or incidents giving rise to the
violations.
Depending upon how disciplinary counsel administers the program, nego-
tiated settlements may undermine the goals of the lawyer discipline system out-
lined above. Because the rules give the complainant and other stakeholders no
voice in the process (in fact, less than provided at formal hearings), their per-
ception of the fairness of the process could be further diminished. Instead of
resolving the particular dispute between the complainant and the respondent,
disciplinary counsel may propose, and the respondent may accept, a weak form
of sanction such as a warning or reprimand. Without a transparent process to
reveal the relationship between the wrong committed and the sanction imposed,
if any, negotiated settlements may appear even more arbitrary and self-protec-
tive than grievance hearings do. Finally, as is true with discipline resulting from
a grievance hearing, if negotiated settlements omit measures to improve the
attorney’s practice or to prevent similar violations in the future, the process
fails to meet its goals of consumer protection.
Much depends upon the orientation and philosophy of chief disciplinary
counsel. In Connecticut, because former chief disciplinary counsel Mark
Dubois was aware of these pitfalls, he used diversion programs to give com-
plainants an enhanced role in the process:
We always include the complainant[s] in discussions about disposition. We view
them as stakeholder[s]. No disposition is final until the Grievance Committee
approves it after a public hearing. The complainants come to the hearing, and are
given an opportunity to address the Committee. They can argue for rejection, or an
alternative disposition. I always try to get them there. I think there is a salutary bene-
fit from being given a voice. Often, they want to confront the lawyer and receive an
apology. And the Committee is very solicitous of them, listens to them, and not
infrequently will reject or modify a disposition to accommodate their concerns.66
As we will discuss below, this simple modification—including the com-
plainant in discussions about negotiated discipline—makes a world of differ-
ence. But not all states will have bar counsel as enlightened as Connecticut’s.
When states adopt negotiated discipline systems, they should draft rules that
require victim participation rather than leaving it to the discretion of the pro-
gram administrators.
65 See Burnele V. Powell, Open Doors, Open Arms, and Substantially Open Records: Con-
sumerism Takes Hold in the Legal Profession, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 717 (1994).
66 E-mail from Mark Dubois to Jennifer Brown, August 15, 2006 (on file with author).
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2. Consumer Protection Model
The consumer protection approach to attorney discipline focuses on law as
a commercial enterprise.67 As such, the model assumes that “consumers of
legal services should be entitled to the same types of protections afforded con-
sumers of goods and services.”68 This approach focuses on legitimate con-
sumer expectations rather than lawyers’ professional norms; the prime object is
to insure reasonable standards of “cost, promptness, and quality of service”
rather than to “identify and weed out unethical behavior.”69
Imposing discipline on offending attorneys misses the point, according to
the consumer protection model: “just as jailing a criminal does absolutely noth-
ing of consequence for a criminal’s past victims, the discipline system does
nothing of consequence for a lawyer’s past victims.”70 The process would be
radically different from current disciplinary procedures because the focus in
this model is on compensating people who have been harmed and protecting
the public from future harm.71 For example, lawyers would be removed from
all regulatory panels because, from a consumer protection perspective, lawyer
self-regulation is a serious conflict of interest.
According to the consumer protection model, complainants are far too
marginalized in traditional grievance hearings, relegated to the role of witness
only and given fewer rights and protections than the respondent. As we have
already seen, disciplinary agencies often fail even to inform the complainant of
important developments such as the dismissal of the complaint.72 To empower
individuals who complain about attorney misconduct, the consumer protection
model would establish a neutral, out-of-court forum where non-lawyers would
control the regulatory process.73
This model would require lawyers to adhere to pro-consumer laws similar
to the ones that apply to other professions. For example, lawyers would be
required to make disclosures to clients regarding various options available to
the client, the amount of time it would take to achieve the client’s objectives,
the costs associated with expected work, and the chances of success.74 The
lawyer would give all of this information to the client in a plain-language con-
tract.75 Additionally, various statutes would require lawyers to issue periodic
progress reports to clients and to return phone calls within a specified time.76
The guiding standard for this new system would be that of the “reasonable
client,” always asking, “What would the reasonable client under these circum-
stances have a legitimate right to expect?”77
67 Chalfie, supra note 54, at 8.
68 Levin, supra note 16, at 25.
69 Chalfie, supra note 54, at 9.
70 Id. at 6.
71 See id. at 8.
72 Id. at 7.
73 See id. at 10–11.
74 Id. at 9.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 9–10.
77 Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Contract would be the fundamental theory underlying such a system:
“[t]he consumer protection model would view a lawyer’s treatment of the client
and the lawyer’s performance of the contract as a business transaction.”78 If the
lawyer failed to perform his obligations under this system’s implicit contractual
terms, the client would be entitled to damages to compensate for direct and
consequential losses.79 The non-lawyer agency could also adjust fees to reflect
poor service, and fines could be imposed for “relatively minor violations of
consumer protection laws, especially in cases where the client has suffered
aggravation rather than economic loss.”80 For injuries such as betrayal of trust
and lack of communication, the injured client “would remain free to sue for
malpractice and to try for a non-economic damage award.”81 Discipline would
only occur for “very egregious conduct.”82 The focus throughout would be on
the expectations of the disappointed client rather than the wrongdoing of the
attorney.83 The central goals would be resolving the specific dispute, repairing
the client’s harm, and protecting the client from future detriment stemming
from the lawyer’s misconduct.
These central goals would be reflected in processes as well. As explained
above, the consumer protection agency—composed of non-lawyers—could
adjudicate claims to adjust fees and award damages. The agency would also
allow the respondent and the complainant to mediate a solution if they so
desired. If the parties could not resolve the dispute themselves, they could sub-
mit to binding arbitration using lay arbitrators.84 Such forms of ADR would
maintain the consumer protection agency’s focus on resolving the specific dis-
pute between lawyer and client and finding a remedy for the client. Presumably
any mediation that occurred would tend to be narrow in focus and directive in
style, with little attention paid to the dynamics of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Even in mediation, far greater stress would be placed on determining the
nature and extent of the client’s damage and deciding how the attorney should
compensate for that harm.
To implement the consumer protection model, states would have to make
enormous modifications or additions to their systems for regulating attorneys.85
It is not clear whether such a system would displace or supplement a traditional
attorney disciplinary system. While many would view the transfer of regulatory
control from attorneys to lay people as a good thing, it is important to take into
account the costs of diluting self-regulation by attorneys. Because the consumer
protection model would emphasize the effects rather than the underlying causes
of attorney misconduct, ethical standards could actually deteriorate. So long as
sloppy or neglectful lawyers were willing to pay damages and fines, they could
continue to practice without any improvement. Thus, the consumer protection
78 Id. at 9.





84 Id. at 11.
85 Allen Blumenthal, Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the
Legal Profession, 3 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 6, 8, 11 (1994).
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model could inadvertently favor wealthy lawyers by permitting them to practice
without discipline. Indeed, some lawyers might begin to view such fines and
damages as the “costs of doing business.” While the consumer protection
model has some virtues in its concern for clients and the harm they suffer, it
does not address the harms unethical lawyers can cause to those with whom the
lawyers are not “in privity”—such as other lawyers, third parties, and court
personnel.86 Reform of the attorney disciplinary system should take greater
account of client concerns, as the consumer protection model does, but it
should not abandon altogether a concern for maintaining attorneys’ high ethical
standards in all of their dealings and relationships.
We see a final issue worth noting before we leave the consumer protection
model: in its zeal to protect the consumer, what account does this model take of
the way a client may have contributed to the lawyer’s professional failure? This
is not a subject that receives much attention, but almost any practicing lawyer
can tell you that some clients are more difficult than others. This difficulty
could stem from a variety of forces in the client’s life: mental illness or addic-
tion, financial distress, emotional upheaval, physical or developmental disabil-
ity, or failure to cooperate and share information with the attorney. Some of
what makes a particular client “difficult” may be purely a matter of personality.
Our point here is that any process designed to illuminate a professional failure
on the part of a lawyer might fruitfully analyze the interpersonal dynamic in
which that failure occurred.87 Neither the consumer protection model, nor any
existing reform proposal of which we are aware, explicitly builds such an
inquiry into the process.
In the case of Taylor and Wilson, a consumer protection model might
render some relief for the frustrated client. Taylor could be awarded damages if
he could prove any actual losses (e.g., higher attorney’s fees paid to the second
lawyer, made necessary by the rush to file the lawsuit within the statute of
limitations). The agency would certainly adjust the fee paid to Wilson to reflect
the poor service Taylor received. For Taylor’s frustration and disappointment
about the shoddy way Wilson treated him, the consumer protection agency
would have no remedy; a civil suit for malpractice might yield a recovery for
such noneconomic damages.88
86 See id. at 14–16. On the other hand, as contract and tort law expand to provide relief for
parties not in privity with tortfeasors and contract breachers, the consumer protection model
of attorney regulation might similarly expand the reach of relief it offers.
87 This could include, if the process permitted it, dynamics between the respondent lawyer
and clients, third parties, opposing lawyers, supervising or subordinate lawyers within the
respondent’s firm, and even the interpersonal dynamics with judges and court personnel,
since it is at least possible that a judge could contribute to the situation that gives rise to an
ethical violation. See infra Part II.C.
88 See John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling
Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1163 (1988); Christopher C. Haug,
The Law of Damages in a Legal Malpractice Action, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 433, 440–41 (2000);
D. Dusty Rhoades & Laura W. Morgan, Recovery for Emotional Distress Damages in Attor-
ney Malpractice Actions, 45 S.C. L. REV. 837, 838 (1994).
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3. Diversion Programs
Diversion programs are another method for states to resolve less serious
complaints of ethical violations. On the one hand, the rules allow a large body
of cases to fall into this category: a complaint is deemed to allege “lesser mis-
conduct” when, assuming the allegations against the attorney are true, the likely
sanction would be less than suspension or disbarment.89 On the other hand, the
Model Rules carve out certain categories of cases and make clear that they do
not involve “lesser misconduct,” such as violations involving misappropriation
of funds, deceit, or a “serious crime.”90 When the allegations do involve lesser
misconduct, disciplinary counsel may refer the attorney to the state’s “Alterna-
tives to Discipline Program.”91
Disciplinary counsel exercises considerable discretion in deciding whether
to make the referral to the “Alternatives” program. The Model Rules encourage
counsel to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, whether diversion has
already been tried, and the summary question of “whether participation in the
program is likely to benefit the respondent and accomplish the goals set forth
by the program.”92 If a respondent attorney is referred to the diversion pro-
gram, disciplinary counsel informs the complainant of this decision.93 The
complainant may then submit a statement if there is any new information
beyond the initial complaint that might be pertinent.94 The respondent may
decline to participate in diversion and may opt for the formal hearing, but the
complainant does not have the power to prevent diversion.95 While it might
seem strange that an attorney would turn down the chance to receive the more
lenient treatment available through a diversion program, recall that when the
traditional grievance system handles cases of minor misconduct, the chance of
dismissal (pre- or post-investigation) is very high. An attorney might decide
that the diversion program is likely to require more of him than the traditional
grievance procedure once these probabilities are taken into account.96
If the respondent agrees to participate in the diversion program, he negoti-
ates a contract with disciplinary counsel setting forth the terms and conditions
of the plan, which may include arbitration regarding fees or other issues,
“mediation, law office management assistance, lawyer assistance programs,
psychological counseling, continuing legal education programs, ethics school,
89 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 9(B) (2002).
90 Id. R. 9(B)(1), (5)-(6).
91 Id. R. 11(G)(1).
92 Id. R. 11(G)(3)(b)-(d).
93 Id. R. 11(G)(2).
94 Id.
95 Id. R. 11(G)(5); see, e.g., John M. Burman, Wyoming’s New Disciplinary Code, WYO.
LAW., Oct. 2003, at 43 (In Wyoming, “[a] complainant may, at the complainant’s expense,
also seek review by the Court ‘of any disposition of a formal charge without a hearing or a
stipulated discipline, except for diversion.’” (emphasis omitted)).
96 Margaret Downie, Ethics in Practice: Criminal Lawyers and the Disciplinary Process,
ARIZ. ATT’Y, May 1997, at 51 (“In reality, however, complying with diversion is often more
expensive, time-consuming, and burdensome than accepting a low-level sanction. The bene-
fit, though, is that it helps lawyers solve problems which, left unaddressed, would likely lead
to more bar complaints.”).
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or any other program authorized by the court.”97 Other than submitting the
supplemental statement described above, the complainant does not help to
decide the alternative terms of discipline, and does not participate in these
negotiations. Once the agreement is finalized, the disciplinary complaint is
essentially tabled pending successful completion of the terms of the contract.98
Arizona has implemented a diversion program very similar to the one described
in the Model Rules.99
Diversion programs are often cheaper and faster than formal grievance
hearings. Since the respondent must first consent to participate in the program,
the respondent is likely to be agreeable and open to recommendations on how
to improve his practice. An enormous benefit of such programs is that the
diversion contract can be specifically tailored to the respondent’s shortcomings
to help prevent similar violations in the future.
However, there are also numerous disadvantages with diversion programs.
The referral is made without the complainant’s consent and does not attempt to
improve the relationship between the complainant and the respondent. The
complainant may never get an opportunity to tell his story and receive an apol-
ogy or other desired remedy. Diversion programs often place such strong
emphasis on the future—including rehabilitation of the lawyer and prevention
of future misconduct—that they ignore the past and present.100 Thus, the par-
ticular dispute that led to the grievance complaint may never get resolved. The
process is likely to increase public dissatisfaction with the legal profession
because it leaves out the complainant and other stakeholders.
Additionally, diversion may not give the public adequate protection from
incompetent lawyers. One important difference between formal sanctions and
diversion remedies is the extent to which they become a part of the lawyer’s
permanent record. Once the lawyer has successfully completed the diversion
program, the charges are dismissed—and eventually expunged from the law-
yer’s record altogether.101 If the lawyer faces a disciplinary complaint in the
future, the earlier complaint handled through the diversion program cannot be
used as a prior sanction in determining whether the lawyer has committed
“lesser misconduct.”102 In contrast, grievance procedure sanctions can be an
aggravating factor in future disciplinary proceedings because those sanctions
remain on the lawyer’s record forever.103
Granted, the discretionary factors disciplinary counsel considers when
making a referral to the diversion program include “whether diversion has been
tried before,” but if the record is expunged it is not clear how counsel would be
97 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(G)(1).
98 Id. R. (11)(G)(6).
99 PROF’L COMM., ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING
AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 117 (1996); Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of Diversion:
Empirical Evidence that Alternative Discipline Is Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1221, 1232 (2003); see also ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 52 (Hearing Panels).
100 Trina Grillo has discussed the dangers of focusing exclusively on the future in mediation
when some parties need to revisit the past. See generally Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alter-
native: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
101 Ellis, supra note 99, at 1232.
102 Id.; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103 Ellis, supra note 99, at 1232.
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able to determine this factor. One would hope that even if the definition of
“lesser misconduct” excludes expunged offenses, that the discretionary factors
would somehow permit disciplinary counsel to prevent repeat offenders from
gaming the diversion program to their advantage—but the system contains no
firm safeguards to ensure this. Thus, the chance to keep a clean record could
motivate many lawyers of good faith to participate in the diversion program
with no ill effects. But the danger seems to exist that some lawyers will use the
program to screen a series of minor offenses which, taken individually, do con-
stitute “lesser misconduct,” but when considered in the aggregate require more
serious treatment by disciplinary authorities. Thus, the public may not learn
about the misconduct, and because lawyers can participate in diversion more
than once without receiving any sanction, the respondent may be insufficiently
deterred from additional violations in the future.104
In Taylor’s case, disciplinary counsel would inform Taylor of the decision
to refer the respondent Wilson to a diversion program. Taylor would likely
object to the diversion since he would not be a party and would not receive an
adequate resolution of his personal complaint. Nevertheless, the diversion
would continue if Wilson agreed to participate. Following an assessment of
Wilson’s practice and procedures, Wilson might agree to an MOU requiring
him to complete a law office management course. Once the required course
was completed, the complaint would be dismissed, potential clients would be
unable to learn about this earlier instance of misconduct, and if Wilson faced a
disciplinary grievance in the future, disciplinary counsel would be unable to
consider the diverted grievance as an aggravating factor in those proceedings.
Jurisdictions also use mediation in their diversion programs.105 For exam-
ple, Rule 5.10 of the Missouri Supreme Court Rules on Civil Procedure indi-
cates that “chief disciplinary counsel may refer those complaints that it believes
may be resolved through mediation rather than through formal disciplinary pro-
ceedings to The Missouri Bar Complaint Mediation Program, which shall
attempt to mediate and resolve the matters raised by the complaint.”106
Although Missouri gives disciplinary counsel considerable discretion, only
nonserious matters are eligible for mediation.107 If the respondent fails to coop-
erate, the disciplinary counsel may consider that failure to be an additional
disciplinary violation.108
104 Levin, supra note 16, at 28 n.130.
105 E.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.10; N.Y. ST. R. OF COURT § 605.20(d)(2).
106 Michael P. Gunn, The New Complaint Mediation Program, J. MO. B., Nov./Dec. 1995.
107 The Missouri Bar Complaint Resolution Program Guidelines, MO. COURTS CLERK
HANDBOOKS, http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/0/fbe703b
8922fd3ea86256ca6005211a8?OpenDocument (last updated July 1, 2003) (“If the respon-
dent lawyer does not participate, or if there is new information revealed whereby it appears
that the respondent has engaged in serious misconduct, the complaint resolution committee
shall return the matter to the chief disciplinary counsel.”); see also Marvin E. Wright, Your
Missouri Bar Membership: A Great Value, 54 J. MO. B. 9, 9 (Jan./Feb. 1998) (“Complaints
about lawyers that are less serious in nature may be resolved through this [alternative]
program.”).
108 Michael P. Gunn, The New Complaint Mediation Program, J. MO. B., Nov./Dec. 1995,
at 358.
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At the start of the mediation sessions, the parties are informed that all of
the proceedings are confidential.109 During the mediation, the volunteer media-
tor helps the parties discuss the problem and reach a resolution. If the parties
reach an agreement, the panel member writes a “closing memorandum” and
sends the memo to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s office.110
Diversion programs using mediation do facilitate communication between
the respondent and the complainant, and the mediation may lead to a resolution
more quickly than formal disciplinary proceedings. However, the perspectives
of the respondent and the complainant may be so intensely focused on their
particular dispute that they miss the bigger picture. Since other stakeholders are
left out of the process, two important failures may occur: first, the mediation
may ignore the root cause of the problem, and second, the mediated solution
may do nothing to help prevent similar violations in the future. Thus, the inter-
ests of the community and the profession in maintaining high ethical standards
among attorneys could get short shrift in mediation. Additionally, cases are
diverted to mediation based upon the complaint rather than a full investigation.
Although the mediator may send the matter back to disciplinary counsel if dis-
cussion reveals that serious misconduct has occurred, the facilitative efforts of a
neutral mediator are no substitute for investigation by disciplinary counsel, and
serious misconduct may get through the disciplinary system without receiving
an adequate sanction.
If the parties in Taylor’s case were referred to mediation, there would
probably be few sessions. Each party would have the opportunity to explain his
actions and hear the other side of the story. Since Taylor was eventually able to
file his suit within the statute of limitations, Wilson and Taylor might agree to a
fairly straightforward remedy: a refund of all fees paid to Wilson and a release
from any fees Taylor still owed.
4. Concluding Thoughts about Attorney Discipline and Attempts to
Reform It
This overview of attorney discipline has highlighted some of the primary
procedures states use to address complaints about attorney misconduct. It has
shown the ways in which a prosecutorial structure creates many of the same
problems that plague criminal justice: an overload of cases and insufficient
resources to address them; neglect of victim concerns and perspectives; and
systems that seem sometimes too lenient (failing to hold guilty people account-
able) and other times too harsh (incapacitating people who might be rehabili-
tated if sufficient time and resources were devoted to their situations).
Reformers have designed or proposed innovative approaches to attorney disci-
pline, but their focus on one particular goal (e.g., protecting consumers,
preventing backlog in grievance proceedings, or resolving complaints with dis-
patch) causes them to fall short of reforms that could improve the system in a
more balanced, holistic way. The next section turns to our proposal for reform,
109 MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.31(b).
110 Panel Procedures, MO. COURTS CLERK HANDBOOKS, http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/
ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/0/4eb9821a2b9eeb5d86256ca60052122e?OpenDocument
(last updated July 1, 2003).
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one that implements Restorative Justice Theory and practice, and explains how
this approach could dominate other proposals for reform.
II. A NEW WAY: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THEORY
A. The Characteristics of an Ideal Attorney Disciplinary System
Before we delve into Restorative Justice Theory and the ways it gives rise
to our proposal, let us pause for a moment to consider, again, the characteristics
we might desire in an ideal disciplinary system. First, everyone seems to agree
that disciplinary processes should protect the public by decreasing the likeli-
hood of similar misconduct in the future. Unfortunately, as the preceding sec-
tion showed, significant misconduct often slips through the system
unaddressed, allowing misbehaving lawyers to get away with and even persist
in their wrongdoing. Moreover, innovative programs designed to grant relief to
individual complainants may do so at the expense of the profession’s ability to
enforce ethical norms and hold lawyers accountable to a larger community
beyond the damaged client. Thus, some of the “reforms” may actually reduce
the system’s deterrent effect.
A second, oft-cited purpose of attorney discipline is to protect and uphold
the fair and efficient administration of justice by holding lawyers accountable
when they break the rules. Upholding the fair administration of justice is seen
as a goal independent of its effect on individual clients or third parties—it is an
interest of the justice system itself. When the legal profession uses attorney
discipline to mark and sanction unethical attorneys, it helps to define and
enforce a standard of ethicality for its own sake. Unfortunately, as we have
seen, the disciplinary system’s inability to keep up with complaints filed and
process them in a transparent way prevents it from setting this standard effec-
tively. Reform programs that further privatize discipline (by, for example,
allowing a volunteer mediator, complaining client, and respondent attorney to
mediate a resolution) only exacerbate the system’s problems with setting stan-
dards and upholding professional values in a public way. Too much control is
transferred to the hands of third parties who may not share the profession’s
goals. Two-party mediation cannot advance the goals of attorney discipline
because it does not include additional important stakeholders (such as repre-
sentatives of the bar, family or friends of the attorney and client, or other
affected members of the community). Similarly, consumer protection models
place undue emphasis on compensating the client’s economic loss, with too
little attention given to the larger set of societal or professional harms that may
have occurred as a result of the attorney’s misconduct.
A third—and for our purposes, extremely important—goal of attorney dis-
cipline is to restore and maintain the public’s confidence in lawyers, the legal
profession, and the rule of law. Under current systems, processes are confiden-
tial, victims are excluded from discussions, and large numbers of complaints go
unaddressed; to make matters worse, lawyers conduct these proceedings with
little involvement from lay people or the community. Members of the public
feel understandable frustration and distrust when, in their absence, a lawyer
who has imposed real harm on a client seems to suffer few negative conse-
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quences: the case is dismissed, the lawyer receives only the gentlest reproval,
or some punishment is imposed but it is cloaked in confidentiality. At its worst,
attorney discipline worsens rather than improves the public view of the legal
profession.
But before we swing back to highly punitive approaches, we should con-
sider the therapeutic goal of attorney discipline. After marking a lawyer’s
behavior as unethical—performing a “shaming” ritual, to borrow the rubric of
John Braithwaite—attorney discipline can also claim as one of its goals the
“reintegration” of the lawyer into the community of ethical lawyers. Alternative
discipline programs that stress education, treatment, or therapy put into effect
this set of goals. Ultimately, such an approach circles back to protection of the
public; it effects general deterrence by marking those who violate the rules and
specific deterrence by discouraging the respondent attorney from harming
future clients, lawyers, or third parties. In standard grievance proceedings, how-
ever, discipline sometimes results in disbarment or suspension—catastrophic
events in the life of a lawyer—when the victim or larger community might
have preferred a more creative, less punitive remedy.
So, confidentiality protects the reputations and careers of attorneys who
are wrongly accused, and the very nature of self-regulation can too often appear
as self-protection to those outside its circle.111 But occasionally the machinery
operates with finality; it ends a legal career, even though the victim might have
preferred a different outcome. Is it in the nature of attorney discipline to rico-
chet between these most extreme results: lenient neglect or harsh punishment?
B. Balancing the Extremes
Ted Wachtel and Paul McCold have observed this pattern in social disci-
pline and have analyzed it as an interplay of two “comprehensive continua—
control and support”:
Control is defined as the act of exercising restraint or directing influence over others.
Clear limit-setting and diligent enforcement of behavioural standards characterise
high social control. Vague or weak behavioural standards and lax or non-existent
efforts to regulate behaviour characterise low social control. Support is defined as the
provision of services intended to nurture the individual. Active provision of services
and assistance and concern for individual well-being characterise high support. Lack
of encouragement and minimal provision for physical and emotional needs character-
ise low support.112
Wachtel and McCold explain that social control mechanisms can range
from “high” to “low” on the “control” and “support” continua, creating a two-
by-two box on which systems can be placed and compared:
111 See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation–Courts, Legislatures or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1241 (2003) (legislative regulation more likely than professional self-regulation to produce
rulings in the public interest).
112 Ted Wachtel & Paul McCold, Restorative Justice in Everyday Life, in RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 114, 116 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2001) (cita-
tion omitted).
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(limit-setting, discipline) neglectful permissive
low indifferent therapeutic
passive protective
low -Support (encouragement, nurture)→ high
Wachtel and McCold note that scholars in various fields have applied this
two-by-two box.114 Leadership effectiveness,115 management style,116 and
parole officer behavior117 have all been viewed through this lens.118 John
Braithwaite extends the model to an even broader set of activities, including
“parenting children, teaching students, supervising employees, regulating cor-
porations and responding to international conflicts.”119
When we attempt to locate existing systems of attorney discipline on
Wachtel and McCold’s support/control grid, we see that most tend to empha-
size either “support” or “control.” As a result, systems end up in the southeast,
southwest, and northwest quadrants, but we lack an attorney disciplinary sys-
tem sufficiently focused on both “control” and “support” to fall into the north-
east quadrant.
113 Id. at 117, fig. 8.2.
114 Id. at 116–17.
115 RALPH M. STOGDILL & ALVIN E. COONS, LEADER BEHAVIOR: ITS DESCRIPTION AND
MEASUREMENT (1957).
116 ROBERT R. BLAKE & JANE S. MOUTON, THE NEW MANAGERIAL GRID 1 (1978).
117 DANIEL GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 289–97 (1964);
DAVID DUFFEE ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND ANALYSIS
396–400 (1978).
118 Wachtel & McCold, supra note 112, at 116–17.
119 Id. at 117. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE
REGULATION (2003).
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TABLE 2: ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS VIEWED THROUGH THE SOCIAL
DISCIPLINE WINDOW
Traditional grievance procedures
when they suspend or disbar.
Disciplinary mediation when the ?
parties hold the attorney
high accountable for the harm to the
↑Control public and the profession.
(limit-setting, discipline) Traditional grievance procedures Traditional grievance procedures
low when they fail to investigate. that result in private reprimands
Disciplinary mediation when the that protect the “in group” at the
mediator fails to adopt a “norm expense of clients and third
advocating” style. parties.
Diversion programs when they Disciplinary mediation when a
allow violations to be expunged client’s goal is simply to exact
from lawyers’ records in a manner remorse and an apology from the
that hampers the disciplinary attorney.
agency’s ability to track
misbehavior and escalate the
response to repeat offenders.
low -Support (encouragement, nurture)→ high
If we try to map consumer protection models onto the “social discipline
window,” we may have difficulty placing them. Consumer protection is
focused on compensating disappointed consumers, not supporting or control-
ling lawyers. Wachtel and McCold’s matrix helps us to see how radical a
reform the consumer protection model would be; it abandons the traditional
goals of attorney discipline altogether. Thus we can see how it is not proposed
to replace attorney discipline—only to supplement it.
Wachtel and McCold’s matrix may also help us tease out the qualities that
we wish to maximize in ongoing attempts to reform attorney discipline. Attor-
ney discipline is a regulatory system that must balance control with support.
Discipline exerts control when it asserts professional values and holds account-
able the lawyers who fail to honor those values. Discipline offers support when
it assists failing lawyers to correct their errors, improve their practice, and come
into compliance with professional norms. Control is expressed in the promulga-
tion and enforcement of the rules of professional conduct, the clear articulation
of conclusions that particular behavior complies with or runs afoul of those
rules, and punishment for violators. Support—interestingly enough—is also
expressed in the promulgation and enforcement of the rules of professional
conduct, as the rules help to educate lawyers and nurture their professionalism.
Attorney discipline additionally gives lawyers support in continuing legal edu-
cation, assistance programs for lawyers struggling with substance abuse or
gambling addictions, help with law office management, “hot line” programs
that give lawyers quick answers to ethical dilemmas, and some disciplinary
proceedings.120 In these ways, Wachtel and McCold’s matrix helps us see that
control and support are both essential goods in attorney discipline. We should
be working to find the optimal value of both. We will argue that Restorative
Justice Theory and practice can point toward models that achieve this.
120 Namely disciplinary proceedings that result in a requirement that the respondent lawyer
seek treatment for addiction or mental illness.
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C. Reconsidering the Characteristics of an Ideal Attorney Disciplinary
System
We believe that attempts to reform attorney discipline would be more suc-
cessful if they would consider three criteria that have been missing from
accounts to date. First, we should ask more pointedly what complainants want
out of the disciplinary process. Second, we should see ethicality not only as a
characteristic of the regulated individual, but of the system as a whole. And
third, we should consider how the attorney disciplinary system itself sets an
example for the attorneys it regulates; we should design attorney disciplinary
processes to treat participants the way we want attorneys to treat their clients:
with respect, and in a manner that facilitates collaboration and problem solving.
We’ll discuss each of these criteria in turn.
1. What Complainants Want
Actually, we know very little about public preferences regarding attorney
discipline. Public opinion polling tells us something about perceived failures of
the system, but fails to solicit suggestions about what should replace it. Several
states have begun to survey complainants after the disciplinary process is com-
plete. Wisconsin sends quarterly surveys to participants in the disciplinary sys-
tem (complainants as well as respondents) to track their satisfaction with the
process and its outcome.121 In most states, complainants do not complete satis-
faction surveys, so we lose opportunities to ask people about their experiences
with the attorney disciplinary system.
The Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in Texas surveys all com-
plainants and asks: “Do you have any suggestions for improving the grievance
system?”122 In Vermont, complainants are asked to complete a questionnaire
following Assistance ADR Hearings. The questionnaire concludes by soliciting
“any recommendations from you about what would have been helpful to you
before, during or after” the hearing.123
We might also glean some knowledge from surveys conducted in other
fields. Because the role of complainants in discipline is so similar to the role of
victims in criminal prosecutions, research into the attitudes of crime victims
may yield some interesting and important lessons about discipline complain-
ants. Crime victims seem to find several important features lacking in the crim-
inal justice system, including “a legitimate role in the processing of their cases
beyond that of witness for the prosecution” and “recognition of the emotional,
as well as material, harm they have experienced.”124
One of the central findings of research on crime victims is that “emotional
and relational forms of reparation seem to be more important to most victims
121 See email from Keith Sellen to Mark Dubois, August 21, 2006 (on file with author).
122 Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Disciplinary System Questionnaire (on file
with author).
123 See Questionnaire (Vermont Lawyer Assistance ADR Panel Hearings) (on file with
author).
124 Strang & Sherman, supra note 49, at 18.
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than material reparation.”125 This finding has dramatic repercussions for attor-
ney discipline. Standard grievance procedures give no attention to complain-
ants’ potential interest in emotional or relational reparation. Instead, the
emphasis in discipline, as in most criminal procedures, is entirely on the guilt
of and the appropriate punishment for the offender.
2. Professionally Responsible Systems
Attorney discipline constructs professional responsibility as an attribute of
individual lawyers. Individuals behave ethically or not, and the system
responds to the failures of individuals. Another, complementary way of concep-
tualizing professional responsibility is to see it as an aggregate quality, some-
thing the profession has as a body and demonstrates in its actions, including its
regulatory procedures. This view requires the system to possess and live out the
same values it demands of the individuals it regulates. Scott Burris and Clifford
Shearing have applied this philosophy to public health systems, observing the
ways that the regulatory and social service system may itself exhibit symptoms
of illness.126
In the case of attorney discipline, “sickness” translates to professional fail-
ure in the form of unethical or incompetent lawyering. Just as we look for the
markers of illness in the system as a whole, to see where it is failing the indi-
viduals within it, so too we might look to the ethical failings of attorney regula-
tory systems, and attorney discipline specifically, to see where it fails to live up
to the standards it sets.
Others have discussed at length the ethical soft spots in attorney regulation
and discipline. Criticism focuses on the conflict of interest inherent in self-
regulation. Some argue that the very standards we set as a profession are self-
serving, designed more for our own convenience and profit than for the service
of the public. With respect to the standards contained in the model rules of
professional responsibility, this seems to be a weak argument. Many of the
rules can be seen as profit-restraining rather than profit-maximizing.127
Although duties of confidentiality and zealous advocacy may appear to serve
lawyers and some clients at the expense of opposing parties and the public,
such rules contain important exceptions that reflect significant regard for the
public interest and require lawyers to exercise responsibility toward those addi-
tional interests, even if it means that they must displease a client.
We can see more strength in the argument that lawyers’ self-regulation
creates a conflict of interest if we shift our discussion from substantive ethics
standards to the way we enforce them. ABA Model Rule 8.3 imposes upon
lawyers a duty to report misconduct if they know another lawyer has violated
125 John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 389, 400 (2003)
(citing HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 18
(2002)).
126 Michael Kempa, Clifford Shearing, & Scott Burris, Changes in Governance: A Back-
ground Review, (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Salzburg Seminar on the Govern-
ance of Health), available at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/phrhcs/salzburg/Global_
Health_Governance_Review.pdf.
127 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Rethinking “The Practice of Law”, 41 EMORY L. J. 451,
459 (1992) (giving examples of profit-reducing rules of professional conduct).
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the rules. This is a sensible rule, since many violations will be visible only to
lawyers working closely with, or in opposition to, the misbehaving lawyer. In
addition, since many rules violations will be somewhat technical in nature and
difficult for lay people to detect, it makes sense to impose upon lawyers the
duty to police each other; we have the best access to the information, and we
have the greatest ability to process that information to determine whether, on
the face of it, a violation appears to have occurred.
But in reality, lawyers are very reluctant to report each other’s miscon-
duct. The most important reason is that lawyers in many specialties and geo-
graphic locations operate within a fairly tight network. A sense of community
and interdependence develops among attorneys who interact frequently. A law-
yer who reports another’s misconduct may be seen as defecting from the sys-
tem of mutual cooperation that prevails in many places and fields of practice.
Such a lawyer may fear that other lawyers will not want to cooperate with him
once he becomes known as a “rat.” A slightly more sinister way of putting this
point is that a lawyer may expect that someday he might need another lawyer to
look the other way when a minor violation occurs; this is an example of the
“you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” mode of practice.
Given these realities, there is good reason to doubt that rigorous policing
and self-regulation can occur within the legal profession. But it is also true that
outside regulators would probably have even less success in detecting and
processing the violations that do occur, because they would not be present to
observe much of lawyers’ behavior. These empirical questions are important
but not dispositive for our purposes. It is enough to note that the structure of
attorney discipline as a closed system in which lawyers judge fellow lawyers
with little or no input from the lay public, may undermine the system’s moral
authority. Just as the ABA Model Rules used to suggest that lawyers ask them-
selves what a “disinterested lawyer” would do when faced with a potential con-
flict of interest,128 so too the profession as a whole might benefit from the
views of parties and entities with differing perspectives to deal with the poten-
tial conflict of interest inherent in self-regulation.
Our point here is that “being ethical” is a task not just for individual law-
yers in their dealings with clients, courts, and third parties, but for the profes-
sion as an entity in its dealings with the public. The next section asks what
specific qualities we might look for in attorney discipline once we construct
ethicality as an attribute of an effective system.
3. Using the Attorney Disciplinary Process to Model Good Lawyering
What if we thought about attorney discipline not just as a quality control
mechanism, but also as a teaching tool? We might look at attorney discipline as
an opportunity to model, for both the lawyers it regulates and the public it
serves, the kind of professional and procedural values it wants to nurture.
Two such professional values the disciplinary process could teach have to
do with the dynamics of attorney client relationships. Model Rules 1.2 and 1.4
give lawyers some guidance about how the attorney/client team should make
decisions about the representation, with clients deciding the “objectives” of
128 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.7 cmt.5 (1998).
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representation and lawyers consulting with clients about “means” to be used to
achieve those ends.129 This sort of consultation and decision-making requires
various skills and activities on the part of the lawyer and the client. They must
share information—the client must share information about the facts underly-
ing the legal problem, about her preferences in resolving the problem, and
about the consequences she sees flowing from the problem and its resolution.
The lawyer must share information about the law, how it might apply to the
facts, and what the legal implications of certain decisions might be. Model Rule
1.4 says that lawyers must communicate with a client, giving the client infor-
mation the client needs to make decisions.130
The theme that runs through Rules 1.2 and 1.4 is one that emphasizes
effective communication and shared deliberation between client and lawyer.
According to this philosophy of lawyering, when attorneys and clients work
together as a team, the attorney can more effectively achieve the client’s goals
and help the client understand when some goals are not achievable or ulti-
mately desirable. This is also consistent with the profession’s interest in “prob-
lem solving” lawyering.
Confidentiality deserves some attention as a professional value, both at the
level of the individual attorney-client relationship and with respect to the sys-
tem as a whole. Within the attorney-client relationship, confidentiality is of
course a bedrock principle, part of the oath most lawyers take upon joining the
profession, and the foundation upon which many rules of professional responsi-
bility are built.131 Attorney-client confidentiality makes it more difficult for
third parties to learn certain facts, as they must develop and investigate the
information independent of the attorney who possesses it.132 At its worst, attor-
ney-client confidentiality can facilitate client wrongdoing by preventing the
only person who knows about it—the lawyer—from disclosing what she
knows. However, the fact that exceptions have developed to permit and in some
cases require attorney disclosure of client misconduct reveals the truth about
confidentiality: it is not absolute. Sometimes other values—such as the integ-
rity of judicial processes, public safety, and even economic interests—can
trump the client’s claim to confidentiality.133
When confidentiality is applied to the attorney disciplinary system, we see
that it has some salutary effects. Confidentiality can encourage lawyers who are
in trouble to seek help for addiction, mental illness, or financial disorder. Con-
129 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.4 (2009).
130 Id. at R. 1.4.
131 Besides MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information),
many additional rules refer back to and fold in assumptions regarding lawyer/client confi-
dentiality. These include rules regarding conflicts of interest, candor to the tribunal, commu-
nications with represented parties, and representation of an organization, to name but a few.
Id. at R.1.7–1.9, 3.3, 3.4, & 4.2.
132 So, for example, rather than deposing an opponent’s lawyer or serving a subpoena on an
attorney that demands the client’s documents, a litigant must take depositions from fact
witnesses and request non-privileged documents from the opponent and third parties.
133 See id. R. 1.6 (b)(1) (disclosure to prevent serious bodily harm or death); id. R. 1.6
(b)(5) (disclosure in a controversy between lawyer and client or in lawyer’s defense against
allegations of misconduct); id. R. 3.3 (duty of candor to court may require disclosure of
client confidence).
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fidentiality can also create greater incentives for other attorneys to report mis-
conduct when they see it, knowing that if the matter will be handled with
discretion, they can avoid a reputation as a “rat.” For lawyers whose mistakes
were minor and unintentional, confidentiality can allow them to learn from the
disciplinary process without undue reputational harm. Confidentiality is most
important for the lawyers who are wrongly accused of misconduct. It allows
them to explain to disciplinary authorities (and, through the authorities, to a
displeased client or third party) that their conduct was ethical even if it carried
some unfortunate consequences for the complainant.
Just as confidentiality is not an unalloyed good in attorney-client relation-
ships, it can also impose some costs in attorney disciplinary processes. We have
already seen the way confidentiality can make it difficult for consumers to
guard against dishonest and incompetent lawyers. Because confidentiality can
allow such lawyers to continue to practice, it both makes future clients more
vulnerable and reduces the specific and general deterrent effects of the discipli-
nary system.
A final downside of confidentiality is less tangible but equally important:
proceedings that are cloaked in secrecy can undermine the open administration
of civil society and its institutions. If we are to know that our courts and their
officers—licensed attorneys—are operating with integrity, we need to know
how the remedial quality control mechanisms are working. When HALT and
other consumer advocates note the public distrust of lawyers that can grow out
of public dissatisfaction with attorney discipline, they are also signaling a
breakdown in people’s faith in a crucial part of their government—the courts.
The more open and transparent the process, the greater trust members of the
public can have in attorney discipline—and this is true even if the process does
not operate flawlessly.
We should also note the way confidentiality can impose a kind of social
control through stigma and the creation of guilty secrets. In the case of attorney
discipline, professional error is treated as a shameful secret rather than a fact of
practicing law. This is not to say that we should strive for desensitization
through greater exposure of the misconduct, but that more open, democratic
discussion of the behavior may help to clarify the many factors that caused it.
And with greater understanding of those causes, we could more effectively pre-
vent it in the future. The thesis of this Article is that Restorative Justice Theory
provides a framework for designing attorney disciplinary processes that would
achieve several goals of reform: giving complainants the experiences they seek,
such as emotional engagement and an opportunity to discuss financial or other
reparations, holding lawyers accountable for the harm caused by their dishon-
esty or incompetence, helping complainants to understand when negative out-
comes are not the result of professional failure on the attorney’s part, and
encouraging a sense of collaboration with the public. To show how restorative
justice offers these benefits, we begin with a brief overview of the field in the
next section and then apply the theory to attorney disciplinary processes in the
section that follows.
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D. Restorative Justice: The Record So Far
The theory of Restorative Justice has been described many times by many
scholars and practitioners. According to Howard Zehr, a long-time leader in the
restorative justice movement, the core principles, inquiries, and concepts of
restorative justice all come in related sets of three.
TABLE 3
HOWARD ZEHR ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
PRINCIPLES, QUESTIONS, AND CONCEPTS
Core Principles of Restorative Questions for Restorative Key Concepts in Restorative
Justice134 Processes to Address135 Practice
Crime [ethical violation] is a Who has been hurt? Concern for victims and their
violation of people and of needs136
interpersonal relationships
Violations create obligations What are their needs? Accountability for offenders,
encouraging them to 1)
understand the nature and
consequences of the harm they’ve
caused and 2) take responsibility
for making things right137
The central obligation is to put Whose obligations are Participation by victims,
right the wrongs these? offenders and communities of
care that enables all of them to
get information about what
happened and then make deci-
sions about how to handle it.138
Since the theory finds its origins in thinking about criminal justice, it is
usually described in terms specific to that area, as one of its founders, Mark
Umbreit, does here: “Restorative Justice is a victim-centered response to crime
that gives the individuals most directly affected by a criminal act—the victim,
the offender, their families, and representatives of the community—the oppor-
tunity to be directly involved in responding to the harm caused by crime.”139
Eric Luna summarized the underlying assumptions that drive this effort to
involve victims, offenders, and community members in an introduction to a
symposium on the topic:
Substantive restorativism contends that crime is not just an act against the state but
against particular victims and the community in general, and for this reason, affected
individuals, family members, and supporters are considered central to crime control
and appropriate resolutions. Restorative justice thus seeks the active participation of
these stakeholders to address the causes and consequences of crime.140
134 HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 19 (2002).
135 Id. at 21.
136 Id. at 22.
137 Id. at 23–24.
138 Id. at 24.
139 MARK UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION: AN ESSENTIAL
GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND RESEARCH xxvii (2001).
140 Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
1, 3 (2003).
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Because the focus of restorative justice is understanding the cause of
crime and helping to repair the victim, restorative practices emphasize “making
amends for the offending, particularly the harm caused to the victim, rather
than inflicting pain upon the offender.”141 This is not to say that the offender is
ignored in these processes. Restorative practices seek to hold offenders
accountable for the harm they have caused; “[a]ccountability is demonstrated
by recognizing the wrongfulness of one’s conduct, expressing remorse for the
resulting injury, and taking steps to repair any damage.”142
The “restoration” in Restorative Justice is threefold. First and perhaps
foremost, the process will pay attention to the victims of crime, and attempt to
restore them to the state of security and wholeness they had before the crime
occurred. Heather Strang and Lawrence Sherman have presented data that show
when victims participate in restorative justice processes they feel more safe and
less anxious or fearful moving forward.143 Second, discussion may focus on
restoring the relationship between the victim and the offender—understanding
the way the offender’s wrongdoing has damaged the relationship and determin-
ing the steps necessary to repair the damage. Apology is often a part of restora-
tive processes.144 In a third  sense, restoration will include a larger circle of
relationships, including the offender’s place in the wider community. As Steven
Garvey explains, the offender has disrupted the essential equality between him-
self and the victim, and has attempted to somehow make the victim subordinate
to the offender or the offender’s own wishes. Restorative Justice seeks to reset
the balance:
The real goal of restorative justice is to achieve reconciliation between the offender
and the victim. The agreement into which the offender enters is only part of the
means to that greater end. Because reconciliation is its goal, restorative justice
implicitly recognizes that crime does more than cause harm: it damages the trust and
equality that ideally define the relationship existing among all citizens of a genuine
political community. The offender’s crime breached that trust and denied that equal-
ity. The repair of that relationship is thus the real goal of restorative justice practices.
When that goal is reached, we say that the offender and the victim have reconciled.
They have, in other words, achieved atonement; they are, once again, at one.145
Thus, while restorative processes are quite clear about the wrongfulness of
the offender’s conduct, the focus may be more upon the reasons for the rules
that the offender has broken; understanding those reasons helps to clarify the
nature of the harm that stems from their violation. To return to the control-
support matrix of Wachtel and McCold, “[r]estorative approaches simultane-
ously exercise high control and high support, confronting and disapproving of
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145 Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 303, 313 (2003) [hereinafter Garvey, Restorative Justice] (footnote omitted).
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In summary, then, we can understand the theory of Restorative Justice best
by reviewing the ideal characteristics and tasks of restorative processes. In gen-
eral, as Zehr and Mika enumerate, processes which work toward restorative
justice:
 focus on the harms of wrongdoing more than the rules that have been broken;
 show equal concern and commitment to victims and offenders, involving both in
the process of justice;
 work toward the restoration of victims, empowering them and responding to their
needs as they see them;
 support offenders while encouraging them to understand, accept and carry out
their obligations;
 recognize that while obligations may be difficult for offenders, they should not be
intended as harms and they must be achievable;
 provide opportunities for dialogue, direct or indirect, between victims and
offenders as appropriate;
 involve and empower the affected community through the justice process, and
increase its capacity to recognize and respond to community bases of crime;
 encourage collaboration and reintegration rather than coercion and isolation;
 give attention to the unintended consequences of our actions and programs; and
 show respect to all parties, including victims, offenders and justice
colleagues.147
1. History
Many scholars contend that restorative justice has its roots in ancient
Arab, Greek, and Roman traditions; Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian philoso-
phies; and processes used by indigenous communities in pre-state and early
state societies.148 John Braithwaite even suggests that “[r]estorative justice has
been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human history
for perhaps all the world’s peoples.”149 Braithwaite’s dramatic claim may be
difficult to reconcile with the retributive traditions that some pre-modern socie-
ties followed, imposing punishments such as beatings, temporary or permanent
exile, or separation from the community.150 In general, however, many scholars
contend that restorative justice principles dominated as the model form of jus-
tice during the early period of history, even though competing practices existed.
As the modern state evolved, the victim-centered criminal justice approach
was displaced by a state-centered system of punishment. This transition has
been linked with the Norman Conquest of areas of Europe, where crime was
transformed “into a matter of fealty to and felony against the king, instead of a
wrong done to another person.”151 The state-centered criminal justice system
focused on legal guilt, determining blameworthiness, and deciding an appropri-
147 Howard Zehr & Harry Mika, Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, in RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 11, at 40, 43 (emphasis added).
148 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 3; Chris Cunneen, Reviving Restorative Justice
Traditions?, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 113, 114 (Gerry Johnstone & Daniel
W. Van Ness eds., 2007).
149 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 5.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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ate degree of punishment for the offender.152 As this ideological framework
developed and transitioned in state societies, certain positive aspects resulted,
such as the reduction of punishment disparities between similar offenders.
However, the main tradeoff was the lost focus on victim restitution and com-
munity control.
To address shortcomings in the state-centered system, renewed interest in
restorative justice principles began to grow in the 1970s. Around this time,
scholars began to study indigenous peoples of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and
the Pacific who had retained their restorative traditions in areas without central
state power.153 At the same time, some of these indigenous groups in North
America, Australia, and New Zealand began to reassert their own customary
laws and practices in response to foreign punitive systems imposed upon them.
For example, the Navajo Nation in the United States began to revive Navajo
common law based upon old customs and traditions that focused on peace-
making. “Navajo methods seek to educate offenders about the nature of their
behaviours, how they impact on others, and to help people identify their place
in the community and reintegrate into community roles.”154 These methods
work toward the restorative goal of seeking to achieve reconciliation between
victims, offenders, and the community.
In Australia, the Aboriginal community became influential in establishing
indigenous courts and indigenous healing lodges as alternatives to prison.155 In
an indigenous court, Aboriginal elders or community members participate in
the court process with a magistrate.156 Sitting on the bench together, they
address the offender, express the views of the community, and advise the mag-
istrate of cultural issues.157 This process establishes and maintains respect for
the elders’ authority in the Aboriginal community and allows the elders to
strike the balance between condemning the offending behavior and supporting
the offender’s potential to be reconnected with the local community.158
According to a magistrate at the Brisbane Children’s Court, “I can say that
since the Youth Murri Court has been held that there has been a reduction in
the number of serious offences committed by young Indigenous persons.”159
He attributes at least a part of this reduction in offenses to the community’s
work in sanctioning and reaccepting the offender.160
In 1989, facing criticism from the indigenous Maori population, New Zea-
land revolutionized its juvenile justice system.161 Because juvenile offenders
were often institutionalized in a custodial setting away from their families with-
out any input from community members, “the Maori community expressed
152 See Mara Schiff, Satisfying the Needs and Interests of Stakeholders, in HANDBOOK OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 148, at 228, 238.
153 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 5.
154 Cunneen, supra note 148, at 115.
155 Id. at 120.
156 Id. at 121.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 121–22.
159 Id. at 121.
160 Id. at 122.
161 Barbara E. Raye & Ann Warner Roberts, Restorative Processes, in HANDBOOK OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 148, at 211, 213.
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concerns that the existing approach was wholly foreign to its traditional values
and destructive of kinship networks essential to its culture.”162 The Children,
Young Persons and Their Families Act of 1989 was therefore passed with a
new emphasis on family group conferences to administer juvenile justice.163
In 1992, Canada changed its sentencing process in response to an opinion
from the Supreme Court of the Yukon in R. v. Moses, which favorably cited
and relied on Aboriginal principles.164 This opinion led to the use of sentencing
circles.165 Framing a criminal offense as a breach of relationships with the vic-
tim and the community at large, sentencing circles gave the community a role
in addressing the causes of the crime and in healing the breach.166 As more and
more restorative practices have reemerged in indigenous justice systems, the
appeal of these practices has become apparent and their transplantability has
been tested. Thus, restorative practices have begun to blossom in a variety of
contexts.
Schools, for example, provide particularly fertile ground for restorative
justice principles. Introducing children to restorative justice at a young age can
help to foster restorative approaches in the broader context of general social
control.167 The applications in this arena are nearly endless due to the variety of
situations and conflicts that develop daily in school systems. Restorative
processes have been implemented to deal with bullying, drugs, property theft,
bomb threats, and disrespectful behavior—all to repair the harm that has been
done to an individual and to the school community.168 Some schools have even
taken the additional step of using restorative practices to be proactive in an
effort to build and strengthen social and emotional bonds within the school
community. These efforts help to improve students’ problem-solving skills by
strengthening their ability to assess emotions and interpret relationships.169
As corporate crime researchers took notice of the broad applicability of
restorative justice processes, they began to inquire about its potential applica-
tion to corporate criminal law. Some scholars, such as John Braithwaite, argue
that a restorative approach is effective for such situations, as long as credible
punishment remains as a viable back up.170 A successful example of restorative
justice processes applied in the corporate context occurred in the early 1990s in
Australia.171 At that time, a widespread insurance scam had come to light in
162 Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 296 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
163 Id. at 295–96; see infra Part II.D for a detailed discussion of family group conferences.
164 Cunneen, supra note 148, at 124.
165 Id.
166 The judge retains the discretion to accept or reject the recommendations of the sentenc-
ing circle, and the resulting sentences are subject to appellate review. Id. See infra Part II.D
for a detailed discussion of sentencing circles.
167 Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice in Social Context, in HAND-
BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 148, at 265, 266.
168 Brenda Morrison, Schools and Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUS-
TICE, supra note 148, at 325, 326.
169 Id. at 327.
170 See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119 (describing the pyramid of responsive regu-
lation, which provides increasingly coercive and/or formal processes to deal with misconduct
if initial, informal processes are unsuccessful).
171 Id. at 22–24.
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which several insurance companies had made serious misrepresentations to
consumers and were charging for completely useless insurance policies.172
In large part, the insurance companies had preyed on uneducated members
of remote Aboriginal communities.173 High ranking officials in the insurance
companies attended numerous meetings with victims, Aboriginal community
council members, and regulators.174 After these meetings, one company volun-
tarily compensated two-thousand victims and established a consumer education
fund for the Aboriginal community.175 The company conducted a large-scale
internal investigation, dismissed numerous agents who had acted improperly,
and implemented new compliance policies.176 If the matter had been prose-
cuted in court, Braithwaite points out:
[a]t best the company would have been fined a fraction of what it actually paid out,
and there would have been a handful of follow-up civil claims by victims. At worst,
illiterate Aboriginal witnesses would have been humiliated and discredited by
uptown lawyers, the case lost, and no further ones taken.177
In the regulatory context government agencies are increasingly adopting
restorative justice principles. Agencies are employing a dynamic model in
which the agency will first initiate a dialogue with the regulated entity in an
attempt to elicit reform and reparation for harm resulting from a regulatory
violation. If the dialogue is unsuccessful, the agency will escalate its response
to become more demanding and punitive.178 The idea is to begin with more
collaborative, informal, and less costly options and to resort to more punitive
approaches only when necessary.179
This approach has been studied in the context of nursing home regula-
tion.180 For a short period, Australia switched from a criminal enforcement
model to a restorative justice model for nursing home regulation.181 Members
of the nursing home industry, consumer groups, unions, and aged care interests
met and developed thirty-one outcome standards for nursing homes.182 During
inspections, inspectors took the traditional steps of auditing plans and records,
but they also spoke with residents and employees about their experiences and
about how the quality of care could be improved.183 After the inspections, con-
ferences were held to discuss each nursing home’s compliance with the out-
come standards.184 These conferences included inspectors and management
officials, as well as employees, residents, and residents’ family members.185 At
the end of such conferences, the parties agreed to action plans that would
172 Id. at 22.
173 Id. at 24.
174 Id. at 23.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 23–24.
177 Id. at 24.
178 Id. at 30.
179 Id. at 29–32.
180 Id. at 17–18.
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improve the residents’ quality of care. Over a two-year period, researchers
found that compliance improved the most when inspectors used praise for
improvements that were achieved, and followed “shaming” of violators with
“reintegration.”186
Therefore a rich history underlies restorative justice theory and practice.
Restorative justice has grown from a belief that subgroups, smaller institutions,
and communities within a larger governmental system can often make deci-
sions about wrongdoing and its consequences more effectively than would
larger bureaucracies or the court system in the ordinary process of prosecution
and adjudication. Restorative justice makes this claim even in contexts where
many of the stakeholders lack experience, substantive expertise in criminal law,
or any prior, demonstrated inclination to be involved in deliberations and deci-
sion-making about crime. Notwithstanding the absence of preexisting regula-
tory commitments by these stakeholders, restorative justice theory and practice
seeks to activate an innate sense of fairness in participants, so that through their
discussions the right course of action will emerge that helps to repair the harm
that has been done.
2. Processes
In juvenile justice, school discipline, and corporate and regulatory
enforcement, several similar processes are often used to implement the restora-
tive justice values discussed above. To provide further clarification about the
actual mechanics of restorative justice processes, this section will describe in
greater detail the characteristics of the most commonly used methods: victim
offender mediation, circle processes, and family and community
conferencing.187
a. Victim Offender Dialogue
Beginning in the 1970s, victim offender mediation (“VOM”) was perhaps
the first restorative process to find widespread adoption in western, industrial-
ized cultures.188 As the name implies, the parties to these mediations are quite
limited; the typical participants are the victim, the offender, and a mediator.
Usually, the mediator will first work with the victim and the offender in sepa-
rate sessions to explain the process and to make sure each party is willing and
able to proceed.189 Then the mediator meets with both parties together and
guides the discussion. The mediator plays a very active role in managing the
dialogue and in ensuring that each party respects the other’s turn to speak.190
The victim has the opportunity to gather information and to receive answers to
questions such as why the offense happened. The victim also has the opportu-
186 Id. at 17–18.
187 For an excellent and very thorough overview of restorative practices as well as empirical
research measuring their effectiveness, see Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the
Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L.
REV. 251, 254–68 (2005).
188 Raye & Roberts, supra note 161, at 212.
189 ZEHR, supra note 134, at 47.
190 Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community,” 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 343, 357 (2003).
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nity to express his side of the story, to explain how he was affected by the
incident, and to describe what he seeks as restitution or vindication. The
offender, on the other hand, is confronted with a situation that encourages him
to listen to the victim and to understand the harm he has caused. In this envi-
ronment, the offender has the opportunity to empathize with the victim and to
accept responsibility for his actions.
In some situations, the parties may prefer indirect VOM where the victim
and the offender do not actually meet in person but instead communicate back
and forth through the mediator.191 To facilitate discussions in this approach, the
mediator may rely on audio-recordings, videotapes, and letters.192 This model
may be particularly useful when there is a power imbalance between the parties
and communication may be too intense for one party if attempted on a direct
basis.193 At the end of victim offender mediation, if the offense did not involve
severe violence, the victim and the offender may sign a restitution agree-
ment.194 If the offense did involve severe violence, an agreement may not be
appropriate and the parties may simply benefit from the cathartic experience
with expressions of apology and encouragement for the future.
Perhaps because VOM was the first restorative justice practice to be incor-
porated into a modern, western criminal justice system, VOM has been criti-
cized for focusing unduly upon the offender.195 Although this critique remains
relevant today, programs have made ongoing commitments to ensure the pro-
cess is more sensitive to victim participants. Pursuant to these commitments,
some programs have abandoned the “mediation” label altogether, opting
instead to refer to the process as “dialogue.”196 Victim offender dialogue pro-
grams reject the assumption inherent in mediation that the parties share equal
status, and thus seek specifically to empower and heal victims of crime.197
b. Sentencing Circles
In sentencing circles, a facilitator convenes a group of people to develop
and recommend an appropriate sentencing plan for the offender. This group can
include the victim and his family and supporters, the offender and his family
and supporters, other community members, and justice system representatives
such as a prosecutor, defense counsel, or judge. This process is rarely used for
first time offenders and relatively “minor” criminal activities because sentenc-
ing circles require a substantial investment of time and effort from numerous
191 Raye & Roberts, supra note 161, at 212.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 219.
194 One of the leading organizations in victim-offender dialogue, the Victim-Offender Rec-
onciliation Program Information and Resource Center (VORP), explains at its web site that
“[o]ffenders take meaningful responsibility for their actions by mediating a restitution agree-
ment with the victim, to restore the victims’ losses, in whatever ways that may be possible.”
About Victim-Offender Mediation and Reconciliation, VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION
PROGRAM INFORMATION & RESOURCE CENTER (VORP), http://www.vorp.com/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2011).
195 Raye & Roberts, supra note 161, at 213.
196 See Janine Geske, Keynote address to John A. Speziale ADR Symposium at Quinnipiac
Law School (Oct. 15, 2010).
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parties in the community.198 “Key factors in determining whether a case is
appropriate for the circle process include the offender’s character and personal-
ity, sincerity, and connection to the community; the victim’s input; and the
dedication of the offender’s and victim’s support groups.”199 The sentencing
circle relies on a very structured process to make each participant feel comfort-
able and engaged. To begin with, chairs for all participants are arranged in a
circle without any table to act as a barrier between the parties.200 The process
then relies on ceremony, guidelines, a talking piece, a facilitator, and consensus
decision-making.201
Once the participants are seated, the facilitator performs an opening cere-
mony to explain the purpose of the gathering and to encourage the participants
to be open and willing to engage with others. The ceremony encourages every-
one to be respectful and positive and to focus on core values. Some of the main
goals of circle sentencing include:
 “Empowering victims, community members, families, and offenders by
giving them a voice and a shared responsibility in finding constructive
resolutions.
 Addressing the underlying causes of criminal behavior.
 Building a sense of community and its capacity for resolving conflict.
 Promoting and sharing community values.”202
The entire circle establishes guidelines that will govern the process. The
participants may have been encouraged to think about proposed guidelines
before the circle process began, but the guidelines are not adopted until the
circle acts by consensus.203 The guidelines establish clear expectations for all
involved and almost always include provisions about being respectful and lis-
tening while others are talking.204
The participants are then introduced to the talking piece—an object passed
around in one direction to each participant.205 When an individual holds the
talking piece, he or she is exclusively entitled to speak while all others are
expected to actively listen. This allows people to be more open and receptive to
the comments of others since they are not thinking ahead and formulating their
own comment until the talking piece circles back to them.206 This also pro-
motes harmony in the circle: no individual can dominate the discussion and
there is no opening for two people to monopolize discussion time with bicker-
ing back and forth.
During the process, the facilitator quietly sets the tone for the circle. His
opening ceremony establishes the circle as a respectful place where all are
allowed to contribute without mockery or embarrassment. Because the guide-
lines and the talking piece largely work on their own, the facilitator usually
198 See Weisberg, supra note 190, at 357.
199 Id.
200 KAY PRANIS, THE LITTLE BOOK OF CIRCLE PROCESSES: A NEW/OLD APPROACH TO
PEACEMAKING 11 (2005).
201 Id.
202 Weisberg, supra note 190, at 356.
203 PRANIS, supra note 200, at 34.
204 Id.
205 Raye & Roberts, supra note 161, at 215.
206 PRANIS, supra note 200, at 35.
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does not have to actively monitor the dialogue. If, however, any problem arises,
the facilitator may speak without the talking piece and may take appropriate
actions to remind the circle of the guidelines they adopted through the consen-
sus vote.207 At all times, the facilitator remains a participant in the process and
may contribute to the discussion and resolution of the problem.208
The group works toward a consensus resolution after all participants feel
that they have fully expressed their thoughts and concerns. Such a resolution
usually cannot incorporate every aspect of the discussion, but by paying close
attention to everyone’s interests, the circle can usually reach an outcome that
all are willing to accept and help implement. Because everyone contributes to
the decision process, the circle participants usually feel invested in the resolu-
tion and are willing to aid in bringing it to successful fruition. The role of the
circle participants is therefore “that of judge, jury, and probation officer as
well, since the groups for both offenders and victims also monitor offenders
and act as victim advocates to ensure that agreements made within the circle
are carried out.”209 Of course, if the circle does not reach a consensus agree-
ment, the process can usually default to the traditional system used for resolu-
tion. Even if that occurs, the traditional system is aided by the increase in
information and the action of all participants.
Circle processes have extensive value beyond the sentencing context. For
example, circles can be formed to provide ongoing support for a victim or an
offender, to resolve community problems, and to address numerous issues in
the educational environment. Circle processes can be particularly useful for
classrooms at the beginning of the school year to foster community and under-
standing and to prevent future dissent and bullying.210 If the children sit in a
circle and follow circle processes, they have the opportunity to learn each
other’s names and to realize what they share in common. The talking piece
ensures that even shy, reserved students have the opportunity to speak in a
respectful environment. By encouraging students to take turns, speak out, and
be attentive to others, bullying can often be prevented or more easily addressed
if it does occur.
c. Family and Community Conferencing
Family group conferencing (“FGC”) incorporates family and community
members in the process of addressing wrongdoing. Public officials or social
justice workers are responsible for consulting the relevant stakeholders to deter-
mine if and when a family group conference should be held and who should be
invited to attend.211 The public official or the social justice worker then acts as
a facilitator throughout the course of the conference.212 The facilitator may not
maintain the same level of impartiality that characterizes a mediator; when the
facilitator is a public official, he may more explicitly bring his own agenda to
207 Id. at 37.
208 Id.
209 Weisberg, supra note 190, at 359.
210 PRANIS, supra note 200, at 72.
211 Luna, supra note 162, at 297.
212 Id.
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the meeting.213 In some situations and in some programs, the facilitator may
even have a formal script to follow.214
Family group conferencing has several advantages over mediation. First,
conferencing involves more community members in the meeting to discuss the
offense, its effects, and how to remedy the harm; it thus contributes to the
empowerment and healing of the overall community.215 Second, conferencing
acknowledges a wider range of people as being affected by the offense and
explores the impact on those people: the primary victim, people connected to
the victim, the offender’s family members, others connected to the offender,
and community members who may have witnessed the crime or dealt with its
effects.216 And third, conferencing allows a wider range of participants to be
involved in assisting with the reintegration of the offender into the community
and the healing of the victim.217
During the conference, the victim has the opportunity to explain his feel-
ings and the consequences of the offender’s actions. The offender has the
opportunity to take responsibility and even apologize for his behavior, and
other stakeholders also have the opportunity to participate. This environment
often supports and encourages genuine remorse on behalf of the offender.
“[T]he presence of the victim and his articulation of the harm he has suffered
frustrate an offender’s attempt to neutralize the offense.”218 And the presence
of the offender’s family, “their personal condemnation of the offense, and the
visible signs of anguish felt by family members confronted by the harm caused
by their own kin all provide exceptionally powerful signals to the [offender] on
the wrongfulness of his conduct.”219 In the end, the participants are expected to
come to an agreement about what is to be done: this could include restitution or
other reparation for the victim, therapy or other rehabilitative work for the
offender.220 The ultimate success of the agreement often depends on the
facilitator’s follow-up, “ensuring that the agreed restitution is being made, that
the necessary services are provided the [offender], and that all other details in
the plan are being met.”221 The only restriction on family group conferences “is
the public’s willingness to finance both the conferencing process and the
accompanying social services” that result.222
213 See id.
214 Raye & Roberts, supra note 161, at 214.
215 For example, “[c]ommunity members and law enforcement can openly discuss the larger
effects of the offense and the rationale for its criminalization, thereby validating both the
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3. Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Processes
A growing number of empirical studies have evaluated the effectiveness of
restorative justice processes in general. Almost every study concludes that
restorative justice processes satisfy victims, offenders, and communities more
than the traditional criminal justice system.223 In addition, restorative justice
processes can have advantageous side benefits, such as reducing the rate of
reoffending.224 The results are therefore encouraging when a matter proceeds
through a restorative justice process. For example, Lily Trimboli’s evaluation
of the NSW Youth Justice Conferencing Scheme concludes that victims report
very high levels of satisfaction about being kept informed, having the opportu-
nity to express their thoughts and opinions, and having a role in deciding how a
matter should be resolved.225 Obviously this study is encouraging for the pros-
pect of restorative justice in attorney discipline cases since a few critical prob-
lem areas that we have identified relate to victim dissatisfaction from being
uninformed and left out of the process.
Interestingly, regardless of whether cases are randomly referred to restora-
tive justice conferences or whether participants elect restorative justice confer-
ences, evaluations indicate that victims in both groups are often still more
satisfied than those whose cases proceed to court. For example, the Reintegra-
tive Shaming Experiments (“RISE”) conducted in Canberra, Australia from
1995-2000, took juveniles who had committed personal property crimes and
offenders up to the age of twenty-nine who had committed middle-range vio-
lent crimes and randomly assigned them either to court or a restorative justice
conference.226 The outcomes in the two groups were dramatically different.
While eighty-six percent of victims in restorative justice conferences received
apologies from their offenders, only sixteen percent of victims in court received
apologies.227 Ninety-two percent of the victims who took part in conferences
said that “all sides got a fair chance to bring out the facts.”228 Interestingly,
contrary to the concerns that have been expressed about the effects of gender in
less formal processes,229 there were no differences in the responses of male and
female victims who took part in conferences, “including victims of violent
223 Hennessey Hayes, Reoffending and Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE, supra note 148, at 426, 432.
224 Gwen Robinson & Joanna Shapland, Reducing Recidivism: A Task for Restorative Jus-
tice?, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 337, 340 (2008).
225 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 49–50.
226 Strang & Sherman, supra note 49, at 25.
227 Id. at 28. It is actually somewhat surprising that apologies occurred as frequently as they
did in the court proceedings.
228 Id. at 35.
229 E.g., Grillo, supra note 100, at 1582–85 (informal processes are more likely to produce
results favoring lying participants); Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Mini-
mizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359,
1366 (1985) (those threatened or intimidated by formal court proceedings may favor an
informal forum); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 89–94, 102–07 (1984)
(mediation is perhaps “the weakest of available formal legal remedies” for abuse cases).
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offences.”230 In sum, the participants in the restorative justice conferences
expressed greater satisfaction than the participants in the court system.
Additionally, in a random assignment evaluation Edmund McGarrell
“found that 97 percent of conference victims ‘felt involved,’ compared with 38
percent of control group victims, and that 95 percent of conference victims felt
they had the opportunity to express their views, compared with 56 percent of
control group victims.”231 In the Queensland Department of Justice conferenc-
ing program, where victims may decline to participate, seventy-eight percent of
victims who elected conferences indicated the process and the resulting agree-
ment helped to “make up for the offence,” and ninety percent of offenders
offered verbal apologies during the process.232
The opportunity to receive and the receipt of an apology play a large role
in increasing victim satisfaction with restorative justice processes. Obviously
restorative justice processes open the dialogue more and provide a more recep-
tive environment for expressing remorse and sympathy. While more offenders
offer apologies in restorative justice settings, a greater percentage of those apol-
ogies are seen as sincere than those offered in a court setting. In the RISE
study, victims viewed seventy-seven percent of the apologies received in ran-
domly assigned conferences to be sincere or somewhat sincere.233 On the other
hand, only thirty-six percent of victims in randomly assigned court cases
viewed the apologies they received as sincere or somewhat sincere.234
The receipt of an apology is just one form of reparation that means a great
deal to many victims. In addition, restorative justice processes allow victims to
play a role in preventing future victimization.235 In Gwen Robinson and Joanna
Shapland’s observations of 280 restorative justice conferences, they found that
four-fifths of outcome agreements addressed the offender’s future behavior and
ways to reduce further reoffending.236 “[V]ictims’ (and their supporters’) aspi-
rations for offenders were often expressed as a desire to help or ‘save’ others
(i.e. potential future victims) from the harm they themselves had suffered at the
hands of the offender.”237
One notable exception to increased victim satisfaction is when a restora-
tive justice process is mismanaged or falls through and the matter ends up
defaulting to the traditional court system. In that situation, victims are often
more upset than if their matter had simply proceeded to court without raising
their expectations of a restorative justice process.238 “The lesson here is that
badly administered programs that do not deliver on their restorative promises to
victims can actually make things a lot worse for them.”239
Although victims generally derive greater satisfaction from restorative jus-
tice processes than from the traditional court system, offenders seem to value
230 Strang & Sherman, supra note 49, at 35.
231 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 50.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 52.
234 Id.
235 Robinson & Shapland, supra note 224, at 341.
236 Id. at 338, 341.
237 Id. at 341.
238 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 47.
239 Id.
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and appreciate restorative justice processes even more than victims. In general,
offenders respond favorably to processes that allow them to participate and that
seem to be just.240 If an attorney therefore felt he had a genuine opportunity to
participate in a just and open process, he should be more inclined to drop the
defensive posture that so often arises in grievance proceedings that are reminis-
cent of litigation. And, the restorative justice process may encourage the attor-
ney to seek help in the future before a problem escalates and impairs the
attorney-client relationship.
As Gwen Robinson and Joanna Shapland point out, the environment
within a restorative justice process can also help facilitate and reinforce an
offender’s decision to desist—to gradually decrease offending.241 Most agree
that restorative processes have the potential to reduce the rate of reoffending,
although there are few studies concerning the impact of restorative justice on
recidivism and restorative justice advocates continually articulate that reducing
reoffending is not a primary goal of the restorative justice practice.242 How-
ever, comparative studies between traditional court systems and restorative jus-
tice practices have produced mixed results.243 In particular, there are always
variations in how certain researchers define reoffending, in how they count
recidivist events, and in the length of time of the follow-up period.244
In a study conducted in New South Wales, G. Luke and B. Lind concluded
that restorative justice conferencing for first-time offenders reduced the pre-
dicted risk of reoffending by fifteen to twenty percent.245 In an experiment in
the United States focusing on first-time offenders age fourteen and younger,
Edmund McGarrell found that restorative justice conferencing produced a forty
percent reduction in reoffending within six months of the initial arrest com-
pared to a control group randomly assigned to other court diversion programs
such as victim-offender mediation.246 G. Maxwell and A. Morris analyzed reof-
fending results between adults who participated in community panel pre-trial
diversion programs and adults who followed a traditional path in court.247 In
one diversion program offenders met with panels of community members, and
in another, offenders met with community members, police, and victims.248 At
240 Id. at 54. Compiling studies across the United States, Mark Umbreit found that offenders
in victim-offender mediation programs expressed an 89 percent perception of fairness in the
process, while only 78 percent of offenders in unmediated cases found their processes to be
fair. Id. In an Indianapolis study, Edmund McGarrell et al. found that 84 percent of offenders
in restorative justice conferences “felt involved,” compared to only 47 percent of offenders
in a control group, and that 86 percent of offenders in the restorative justice conferences felt
they had the opportunity to express themselves, compared to only 55 percent of offenders in
control groups. Id. Additionally, in the Queensland Department of Justice conferencing pro-
gram 96 percent of young offenders agreed with the following propositions: you “would be
more likely to go to your family now if you were in trouble or needed help,” and you have
“been able to put the whole experience behind you.” Id. at 55.
241 Robinson & Shapland, supra note 224, at 347, 352.
242 Id. at 339–40.
243 Hayes, supra note 223, at 432–33.
244 Id. at 433.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 434.
247 Id. at 436.
248 Id.
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each panel session, the parties discussed the offender’s conduct and developed
a reparative plan.249 Twelve months later, only thirty-three percent of offenders
in the first diversion program were reconvicted compared to forty-seven per-
cent of offenders who proceeded through court.250 And only sixteen percent of
offenders in the second diversion program were reconvicted compared to thirty
percent of offenders who proceeded through court.251 In a U.S. study of the
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania Restorative Policing Experiment, P. McCold and B.
Wachtel were unable to reach any firm conclusions regarding reoffending rates
of young offenders randomly assigned to restorative justice conferencing or the
youth court due to the offender’s ability to decline to participate in the confer-
ence.252 The researchers noted that “[i]t appears that any reductions in recidi-
vism are the result of the voluntary programme diverting from formal
processing those juveniles who are least likely to reoffend in the first place.”253
And in the RISE study, conferencing reduced the reoffending rate of young
violent offenders compared to those randomly assigned to court.254 But the
researchers found no significant difference for property offenders, and drunk
drivers who were referred to conferencing actually had an insignificant higher
rate of reoffending than those who proceeded through court.255
Lastly, community members who participate in restorative justice
processes report high levels of satisfaction. Due to the group setting of these
processes, all benefit from enhanced relationships that develop through dia-
logue and sharing.256 According to the Ministry of Justice, Western Australia,
there is “93 percent parental satisfaction, 84 percent police satisfaction, and 67
percent judicial satisfaction, plus (and crucially) satisfaction of Aboriginal
organizations with its restorative justice conference program.”257 In particular,
restorative justice processes can help to restore and build the social bonds of
families, to provide support for the offender and victim, and to help prevent
recidivism.
E. Applying Restorative Justice Theory to Attorney Discipline
The history, processes, and empirical studies relating to restorative justice
theory demonstrate that this theory is ripe for application in new environments
and contexts. As such, this section will attempt to transplant Restorative Justice
Theory from criminal justice, where it has found most frequent application, to a
new area, attorney discipline.
1. Fit
Several key characteristics of attorney disciplinary cases make them good








256 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 66.
257 Id. at 67.
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a. A Community of Shared Norms
First, and perhaps most importantly, restorative justice has been most suc-
cessful in cultures and communities where participants could build agreement
around shared values and norms.258 Attorney discipline occurs in a community
of (at least theoretically) common values, as lawyers share a common educa-
tion, oath of office, and ethical code. In a disciplinary case, factual questions
may raise serious issues about whether violations occurred and, if so, how
severe they are, but the underlying rule is rarely in doubt. The applicable norms
should be very clear. The assumption of shared values clearly applies to any
grievance brought by one lawyer against another, rare as these cases may be.
But in the far more common run of cases, when a client brings a grievance
against a lawyer, the circle must expand to include someone who is not a mem-
ber of the professional community. It may at first seem unfair to assume that
such a person knows the rules of professional responsibility, much less
endorses or adheres to those rules. But when clients hire lawyers, they volunta-
rily enter into the community of lawyers, if only as consumers of their services
or participants in the institutions that lawyers serve. Even indigent criminal
defendants or members of a class action lawsuit, who may not personally
choose their lawyers, still make a choice to be represented. When they decline
to opt out of that relationship,259 they buy into the community in the same way
a client does who personally retains a lawyer. These clients therefore enter into
a relationship that is laden with norms.260
b. An Explicitly Self-Regulating Community
In a community that explicitly takes on the responsibility of self-regula-
tion—policing, reporting, and punishing peer misconduct—a transplanted
model of restorative justice should find even more fertile ground than it enjoys
in the context of criminal law. Many of the stakeholders in a disciplinary case
will be lawyers, including the respondent, the chief disciplinary counsel, the
respondent’s law partners, and in some cases, the complainant. These stake-
holders have opted into a profession known to be self-regulating, one that
imposes on its members a duty to report misconduct when they come to know
of it261 and to share truthful information when requested by a disciplinary
authority.262 This will not necessarily make them better or more valid partici-
258 For some skepticism about whether a community of shared norms exists in many con-
texts where victim-offender mediation is promoted, see Brown, supra note 8, at 1292–95.
259 Here the double negative is accurate, since this is usually a passive decision and default
outcome.
260 Most of those norms are for the clients’ benefit and protection, but some can cut against
their interests. Confidentiality rules, for example, will usually protect a client, but they are
also the animating force in rules against certain types of investigation, preventing ex parte
communications with another lawyer’s client. So the norm of attorney-client confidentiality
will both protect the client and protect others (including a client’s opponent) from actions the
lawyer might otherwise take on the client’s behalf.
261 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.3 (1983). See also cmt. [1] (“Self-regulation of the
legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation
when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
262 Id. R. 8.1. The obligation to share information applies whether it is the lawyer’s own
behavior or another lawyer’s conduct that is the subject of the disciplinary proceeding. See
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pants, but it does create a context in which many of the participants have preex-
isting commitments to engage and work together for the good of the public and
the profession—good conditions for a process that requires stakeholders to take
responsibility for outcomes.
c. Therapeutic Goals
It is perhaps significant that restorative processes have taken hold most
firmly in juvenile cases, where rehabilitation remains, at least in theory, a cen-
tral goal of the system. In criminal law, where the goal of rehabilitation has
been eclipsed by specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, and (in some
cases) retribution, restorative programs have been a slightly harder sell.263 But
this factor suggests that restorative justice theory should find a much more
receptive environment in attorney discipline, where reintegration of the
offender into the community of ethical lawyers remains an important and
explicit goal of the system in the overwhelming majority of cases. Disbarment
occurs in only a small fraction of the cases that go to a hearing.264 Even when a
lawyer is disbarred, many states permit the lawyer to apply for readmission at
some point in the future. Thus, even the most grievous offenders are, at least in
theory, redeemable. For less serious offenses, other forms of discipline often
require lawyers to earn their place in the profession by completing psychologi-
cal therapy, enrolling in CLE courses, or undergoing drug or alcohol treatment.
The system is already designed to give disciplinary counsel some discretion
and flexibility when proposing alternative discipline. Ethics committees are
similarly granted flexibility when imposing discipline after a finding of guilt.
Restorative justice theory merely takes the flexible, rehabilitative power
already granted to existing decision makers in the system and redistributes it to
include a broader array of stakeholders.
d. Identifiable Stakeholders
This redistribution of decision making power is made easier by the fact
that attorney disciplinary cases usually involve a readily identifiable group of
stakeholders—people who have been affected by the attorney’s misconduct or
will be supporting the attorney’s attempts to repair the harm he has caused and
to behave ethically in the future. In fact, it may be even easier to identify stake-
holders in disciplinary cases than it is in criminal cases, where restorative jus-
tice has been developed most fully. If restorative practices can assist in criminal
law, where “the community” is not always readily identifiable, then it should
even more readily assist with attorney disciplinary cases.
When an attorney is hired by a client to assist with a private matter, such
as a divorce or a personal injury lawsuit, we can say that the general commu-
nity has an interest in the fair administration of that matter, but the substantive
cmt. [1] (“The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer’s own admission or discipline
as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly
make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the
lawyer’s own conduct.”).
263 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE 21,
32 (2007).
264 See supra note 44.
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rulings will directly affect a relatively small circle of people and institutions. If
the attorney breaches her duty of care or competence to the client in a way that
causes damage, the matter frequently remains private as the client seeks com-
pensation through civil legal malpractice. The fact that the lawyer has also vio-
lated a rule of professional conduct will in some but not all cases also give rise
to a disciplinary grievance, causing us to reframe the case as one in which the
profession has a self-regulatory interest. In current practice, the disciplinary
counsel steps in to represent the profession and displaces the claimant entirely
as a party; in restorative justice each stakeholder can remain as others are added
to the process. Similarly, in current practice, disciplinary counsel represents the
interest of the public in maintaining an honest and competent bar; in restorative
practice, the process could include specific members of the community who
might step forward to express a particular interest in the outcome of the griev-
ance. The fact that disciplinary counsel (or her deputy) is present ensures that
the interests of the public and the profession, ordinarily represented in standard
disciplinary processes, will not be undermined. But the process is flexible
enough to admit the readily identifiable persons and entities with legitimate
interests and contributions to make in facilitating the fact-finding, adjudicating,
and rehabilitative goals of the process.
e. The Difficult Tension between Confidentiality and
Transparency
When a disciplinary complaint is filed against a lawyer, the disciplinary
authority does not make that complaint public immediately. Only under special
circumstances will the pendency, subject matter, or status of an investigation be
disclosed outside the agency.265 The records of the agency usually will become
available to the public once the chief disciplinary counsel has found probable
cause to believe that a violation has occurred—and has filed and served formal
disciplinary charges.266 Even then, the work product of disciplinary counsel,
the hearing committee, and the ethics review board will be confidential.267 And
while the finding of probable cause triggers formal proceedings that are open to
the public, the deliberations of the hearing committee, review board, or court
are not. Thus the timing and extent of disclosure to the public reflects a desire
on the part of disciplinary authorities to protect the respondent and the com-
plainant at early stages before the allegations are investigated and confirmed;
but even after the allegations are confirmed, secrecy will cloak much of the
deliberation determining whether and at what level of severity discipline should
be imposed.
Confidentiality prior to the finding of probable cause reflects a desire on
the part of the bar to make sure that lawyers are not subject to informal sanction
and embarrassment too early, before the allegations of a complaint are verified.
265 See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 16(B) (2002) (Disclo-
sure can occur if respondent waives confidentiality, complaint alleges conviction of a crime
or discipline by another state, allegations of the complaint have become “generally known to
the public,” or notification is necessary “to protect the public, the administration of justice,
or the legal profession.”).
266 Id. R. 16(A).
267 Id.
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Secrecy of the disciplinary counsel’s work product and hearing committee
deliberations facilitates freer exchange of ideas, argument, and debate within
the decision-making authority. While this may improve the quality of decision
making overall, it can have the unfortunate effect of enclosing the decision
making in a sort of black box from the perspective of the public, including the
complainant. Because only a portion of complaints will even be investigated,268
and an even smaller number of these will result in a finding of probable cause,
much of what occurs within disciplinary agencies never sees the light of day.
Balancing the confidentiality that protects innocent respondents and theo-
retically improves decision making with the public’s need for protection and
the victim’s desire to know about discipline is a difficult task. Restorative
processes could work within existing confidentiality rules to address demands
for greater accountability without publicizing allegations before they are
proven. Victims and others immediately affected by the misconduct would get
greater access to information at an earlier stage in the development of the case,
since they would be directly involved in the discussions. But the restorative
approach would also protect interests in confidentiality, because the processes
would be open to invited stakeholders rather than the public in general.
Because disciplinary counsel would invite people who have already been
affected by the alleged misconduct, participation (and thus disclosure) would
be limited to people who already know about the incident or behavior giving
rise to the complaint. Granted, this would fall short of the completely open,
public processes desired by some reformers. But on net, transparency would
increase as restorative processes would give greater participation and disclosure
of information to stakeholders, who often lack information in the present
system.
f. A Relationship of Trust
Perhaps the most important characteristic of attorney disciplinary cases
that makes them good candidates for restorative justice theory is that the events
giving rise to a grievance usually occur in the context of a relationship of trust,
so that one or both of the parties may feel a sense of violation, betrayal, or
damage to an important relationship. Restorative processes are well suited to
such situations because they devote attention to the relationship in ways the
traditional investigative and adjudicative processes do not.
This is most obviously true when the grievant is a client or former client of
the offending lawyer. The most common causes of attorney discipline—neglect
and failure to communicate—are direct and disrespectful attacks on the attor-
ney-client relationship. The client may rightly feel that the lawyer has breached
the client’s trust.
A different sort of betrayal of trust can lead one attorney to complain
about another’s misconduct. Lawyers follow the Rules of Professional Conduct
expecting that others will do the same. Although they could gain an advantage
over opposing parties and lawyers through certain rules violations—e.g., lying
in negotiation or presenting false testimony—they forego these perceived
advantages and require others to as well. When another lawyer breaks that
268 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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social contract, his violation can come at the expense of a lawyer who has
followed the rules (or that lawyer’s client).269 It is not unreasonable for the
attorney who has been harmed to feel a sense of anger and betrayal about the
behavior of the offending attorney.
Restorative Justice—both in theory and in practice—emphasizes the
repair of relationships as one of its central goals. This feature is believed to be
salient even in cases where the relationship between criminal offenders and
their victims is quite attenuated, existing only because they are fellow residents
of the same neighborhood or town and not because they were actually
acquainted prior to the occurrence of the crime. Many victims benefit from
restorative processes even when the only relationship to be repaired is that of
equal, mutually respectful members of a community.270 How much more, then,
might restorative practices help to resolve and repair harm that has occurred in
the trust-based relationships among lawyers or between attorneys and their
clients?
g. The Benefits of Shaming
To conclude this section about fit, let us say a few words about the emo-
tional component of this process from the respondent-lawyer’s perspective.
When reintegration of an offender is the ultimate goal, John Braithwaite tells
us, processes that include some element of “shaming” may be beneficial.271 In
this view, an offender’s shame or guilt helps to reinforce the norm that has been
transgressed. But it also does more, according to Herbert Morris: “[S]hame
leads to creativity,”272 moving people to take “the steps that are appropriate to
relieve shame.”273 Jeffrie Murphy concurs: “[A]ttention to the shamed self can
be a sign of health and a stimulus to moral improvement—the attempt to mold
a better character—through the painful prod that such shame provides.”274 Ste-
phen Garvey explains how the experience of guilt can lead to a larger series of
269 A knowing violation of a rule also sends a signal, intended or not, of moral superiority,
according to Stephen Garvey: “I say through my actions: ‘You may have to follow the rules,
but I don’t. I set myself over and above the rules I expect everyone else to obey. Only the
little people follow the rules.’ I say, in short: ‘I’m better than you.’” Stephen Garvey, The
Moral Emotions of the Criminal Law, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 145, 161 (2003). For Garvey,
the way to counter this signal is through punishment that calls for atonement from the
offender for this false message. Id.
270 Stephen Garvey has argued, however, that one of the purposes of punishment is to reset
this equality:
When the state punishes, it therefore says two things. First, it says to the offender: ‘We condemn
what you did. We will not tolerate it here. You are no better than the rest of us, including the one
you wronged.’ Second, it says to the victim, ‘We stand by you. You are a prized member of the
community. We know that, and we want you to know that too.’
Stephen Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1821 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Garvey, Atonement].
271 Indeed, Braithwaite has developed the theory of “reintegrative shaming” which incorpo-
rates “disapproval of the act within a continuum of respect for the offender” and “rituals of
forgiveness.” BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 74.
272 Herbert Morris, Guilt and Punishment, 52 THE PERSONALIST 305, 318 (1971).
273 Id. at 319.
274 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Shame Creeps Through Guilt and Feels Like Retribution, 18 LAW &
PHIL. 327, 341 (1999).
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actions that bring an offender back into a right relationship with the
community:
[The offender] must truly feel guilty, for the experience of guilt is the proper moral
response to one’s wrongdoing. Second, he must willingly undertake steps to expiate
his guilt, which he can only do through a series of undertakings designed to repair all
the damage—material and moral alike—resulting from his crime. Accordingly, he
must apologize for his conduct, thereby providing an outward manifestation and dec-
laration of his repentance. He must make reparations in order to repair any material
injury he has caused. Finally, he must bear some tangible burden or hardship through
which he expresses his remorse, humbles his will, and thereby repairs the moral
injury he has caused. A retributivist might call this last undertaking punishment, but
that would be a mistake. A punishment is imposed on an offender. Here, in contrast,
the offender accepts the burden, and indeed, welcomes it as the necessary price to be
paid to expiate his guilt. We should therefore call it what it is: a secular penance.275
Currently, attorney discipline is not structured to facilitate this cycle from
guilt to apology, reparation, and penance. In hearings, attorneys facing disci-
pline understandably concentrate on putting the disciplinary authority to its
proof. This is a sensible move in a prosecutorial system, but lawyers often
launch a vigorous defense even if some or all of the allegations are true. The
adversary system calls for such behavior, after all. Even in states that have
adopted alternative discipline, the lawyer negotiates with disciplinary counsel
“in the shadow” of disciplinary proceedings, and a narrower range of issues are
usually on the table: drug or alcohol rehab, CLE training, or treatment for other
physical or mental illness.
Whether the process is litigation or negotiation, a bilateral structure in
attorney discipline pits the lawyer’s interest in minimizing or avoiding disci-
pline against the disciplinary counsel’s interest in disposing of the case expedi-
tiously while also preventing future misconduct by the lawyer. Without the
complainant present to describe and hold the lawyer accountable for the harm
caused by the misconduct, the process is unlikely to induce much guilt or
remorse on the lawyer’s part. Indeed, when the case is framed as the action of
the bar against the lawyer, the process may induce in the lawyer more feelings
of defensiveness than repentance.
Restorative processes, in contrast, bring wrongdoers face to face with the
people they have harmed. Their wrongdoing is discussed not just in the abstract
or technical terms of the rules, but also in terms of the concrete consequences
for the person most negatively affected. Instead of analyzing only the lawyer
and his actions, the participants expand the focus of discussion to include
greater analysis of the harm the lawyer has caused. This discussion can corre-
spondingly expand the lawyer’s feelings about the incident from mere embar-
rassment about a series of mistakes (e.g., neglecting a matter, failing to return
phone calls, and missing a filing deadline) to a fuller sense of shame and sor-
row about the consequences those mistakes had on other people (e.g., their
frustration, confusion, or additional economic loss). In economic terms, we
could say that the lawyer’s behavior has created “negative externalities,” bad
spillover effects that impact the bar, the court, other lawyers associated with the
respondent, and most profoundly, the complainant. By giving this broader array
275 Garvey, Restorative Justice, supra note 145, at 313–14 (footnotes omitted).
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of stakeholders a role in the process, attorney discipline can more effectively
compel the respondent to “internalize” these negative externalities. And the
more thoroughly a process can force respondents to come to terms with the
costs of their bad acts, the greater the deterrent effect.
2. Function
Having persuaded you (we hope) that Restorative Justice theory “fits” the
characteristics and goals of attorney discipline, we will try to give a sense of
how restorative practices might function in attorney disciplinary systems.
The goal, as we have stated before, is to create enhanced roles for clients
or third party victims of attorney misconduct and to permit additional stake-
holders (such as the offending attorney’s firm, friends, or family, the attorney’s
malpractice insurance carrier, therapeutic professionals or other supporters
(such as AA sponsors), as well as friends, family, or other community members
wishing to support the client or third party victim) to give input into the fact
finding processes, help make some decisions about the appropriate sanctions to
be imposed, and make commitments about how they will aid the attorney in
performing the tasks assigned him and help him fulfill his professional aspira-
tions and responsibilities in the future.
First, a preliminary note about design: as Stutzman, Amstutz, and Mullet
have argued in the educational context, it is a mistake to “propose a cookie-
cutter approach to restorative discipline.”276 Instead, they remind us that
reformers should be sensitive to the qualities and characteristics that make their
communities unique. Restorative Justice Theory thus serves as a guide, but
people on the ground have to tailor processes to particular settings. For exam-
ple, the optimum number of participants may turn in part upon the attorney’s
client base: if the attorney is deeply embedded in a relatively small geographic
region where people know each other and know him, the wronged client may
have neighbors who feel a strong stake in the disciplinary matter. The same
could be true when a lawyer serves a particular ethnic, immigrant, or industry
group (though in the latter case, competition between the wronged client and
other interested “community members” might complicate their bid to partici-
pate in the process). Making the concept of “community” meaningful is com-
plex; it is not enough to say that interested “community members” should
participate in restorative attorney disciplinary processes. Someone has to decide
who should participate in each case given the specific circumstances of the case
and the types of communities involved. This will not be a decision that discipli-
nary counsel, the respondent, or the complainant can make in isolation, but
between the three of them, they may think of others who ought to participate
(and those others might, in turn, know of additional stakeholders who ought to
participate).277
The take-home point is that it will not do to prescribe the exact contours of
the process from afar; the bar of each state would need to tailor the process to
276 LORRAINE STUTZMAN AMSTUTZ & JUDY H. MULLET, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE
DISCIPLINE FOR SCHOOLS 4 (2005).
277 See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE
(1987) (on public disputing and how to identify stakeholders).
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local needs, even giving county, city, or substantive specialty bar associations
some say in process design.278 In this section, therefore, we will only sketch a
process design that might be used to implement Restorative Justice Theory in
attorney discipline. The details of the model would vary from place to place
and case to case.
a. Participants
Restorative discipline should use a conferencing model that includes mul-
tiple parties, not just the respondent and disciplinary counsel.279 The disadvan-
tages of bilateral plea bargaining280 and even triangular victim-offender
mediation in the criminal context have been analyzed by Brown and others.281
We do not propose to replicate those processes in attorney disciplinary cases.
Instead, we recommend a larger group where a broader array of interests will
be expressed and the strongly polarized views of the complainant and respon-
dent softened by other participants.
For example, Braithwaite and Mugford282 as well as Retzinger and
Scheff283 suggest that structuring the process as a conference that includes the
offender’s support network as well as the victim’s network can do a better job
than mediation in preventing the complainant from going overboard with
“moral lecturing and sarcasm.”284 Braithwaite elaborates:
If these invitees really do care about the offender, they will counter moral lecturing
with tributes to the sense of responsibility and other virtues of the offender. . . . [T]his
is the genius in the design of a Maori whanau conference, a Cree healing circle, or
Japanese school discipline that is absent in the design of dyadic Western victim-
offender mediation.285
Stephen Garvey286 and Paul H. Robinson287 agree that “group conferences
and circles are, by virtue of the group dynamics that constitute those processes,
278 Granted, there is a tension between local control, which can give legal communities a
greater sense of ownership in their own ethical self-regulation, and centralized state control,
which increases fairness by making treatment of unethical lawyers more uniform, preventing
local favoritism and lax enforcement in some communities where relationships are too tight.
See TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, CONN. BAR ASS’N, DRAFT
REPORT 31 (June 2006) https://www.ctbar.org/userfiles/Committees/FutureOfTheProfession/
CBA_Future_Report.pdf (section on Professionalism notes the advantages of wresting some
control from local ethics panels who were reluctant to discipline neighboring colleagues).
279 Restorative processes that utilize this model are community panels or boards, sentencing
circles, and some processes with community elders.
280 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudi-
cative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1808 (1986).
281 See generally John Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reinte-
gration Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1994);
Brown, supra note 8; Suzanne M. Retzinger & Thomas J. Scheff, Strategy for Community
Conferences: Emotions and Social Bonds, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECTIVES 315 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996).
282 See generally Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 281.
283 See generally Retzinger & Scheff, supra note 281.
284 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 141.
285 Id.
286 Garvey, Restorative Justice, supra note 145, at 316.
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less likely than victim-offender mediation to result in excessively harsh or
excessively lenient sanctions.”288
Thus, as we have stated above, the conference could include but not be




 others from the state bar,
 the complainant’s family or other support network,
 the respondent’s law partners,
 therapists or twelve-step sponsors,
 the respondent’s insurer,
 the respondent’s family or other support network, and
 a facilitator.
The key characteristics that should qualify people to participate in the con-
ference would be that they have been affected in some significant way by the
alleged misconduct, or that they will be a part of the attorney’s attempt to repair
the harm caused and avoid misconduct in the future.
b. Procedure
Though details can change to fit specific cases, several features of confer-
encing or circle processes seem to remain constant. These features help to pro-
mote equal voice and participation for the people there.
For example, to convey a message of equality, participants sit in a cir-
cle.289 This would require some special care, because conference tables in most
courthouses and other government buildings tend to be rectangular or elliptical,
and these shapes can sometimes give primacy to the people who sit at the ends
of the table. If the table is a square, attention and authority can seem to concen-
trate on the people in the middle of each side of the square, and away from
those near the corners. The facilitator could simply arrange chairs in a circle,
but this might prove difficult for participants who want to work with documents
or computers while the conversation is progressing. A single large, round table
would consume a lot of space and would remain the same size whether five or
fifteen people were participating in the conference. Large groups might feel too
crowded. Small groups would have to contend with large spaces between par-
ticipants and the difficulty of maintaining equal spacing between people; those
more closely aligned might drift toward each other, could create clumps of
partisan interest and hinder conversation.
The better approach, therefore, would be for agencies that initiate confer-
encing to invest in a number of smaller, individual tables that can be easily
moved and rearranged to form a circle that is just large enough to accommodate
the number of people participating. While it might seem silly and unnecessary
287 See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of
“Restorative Justice”, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 375–77 (2003).
288 Garvey, Restorative Justice, supra note 145, at 316.
289 Kay Pranis, Restorative Justice, Social Justice, and the Empowerment of Marginalized
Populations, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE 292–93 (Gordon Basemore & Mara
Schiff, eds., 2001).
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to go into such detail with respect to seating arrangements, many are the neu-
trals who can recount the mediations that succeeded or failed based upon the
physical arrangement of the room.290 Particularly when a process is new to a
system, attention to small details can give participants the best chance to make
the process work, and the physical arrangement of the room can affect the pro-
ceedings before a single word is said.
Kay Pranis has noted that traditionally, “[t]itles are not used in the circle
process, thus minimizing institutional authority as a relevant element of deci-
sionmaking.”291 Thus, while each participant’s position in the case would be
important for others to know (e.g., participants are entitled to know that a mal-
practice insurer has an interest and perspective that stems from its economic
relationship to the respondent), it would not be necessary or helpful to highlight
people’s official positions, if any. This would be especially important for par-
ticipants with governmental positions, such as disciplinary counsel or judges.
Consider a case in which a judge had initiated disciplinary proceedings against
a lawyer in addition to whatever court sanctions she was authorized to impose.
What a dramatic difference it would make if, during the disciplinary confer-
ence, other participants referred to the judge as “Ms. X” rather than “Judge X,”
or if even more dramatically, the participants decided that they would use first
names in their discussions! Some judges would no doubt resist such informal-
ity, but this is the sort of equality that facilitates discussion about the personal,
emotional consequences of a lawyer’s bad conduct.
A purist approach to circle processes would make use of a “talking piece”
(e.g., a feather, a stone, or a foam ball) to structure the discussion. Again, Kay
Pranis explains: “The talking piece creates space for the ideas of participants
who would find it difficult to insert themselves into the usual dialog pro-
cess.”292 Because few people in western societies have experience using talking
pieces, it can feel strange and a bit stilted at first. But skilled facilitators can use
the talking piece to break the ice and cut through the formality that might
impede discussion.293
Once the list of participants is established and they are seated in the room,
the question arises: what will they talk about? Restorative Justice asks the fol-
lowing questions, all of which could be addressed in proceedings stemming
from an ethical violation or professional failure:
 Who has been hurt?
 Who has a stake in this situation?
290 In fact, Jennifer Brown recalls the first meeting of the American Bar Association Section
on Dispute Resolution in Boston, MA. Never had she been around so many people who
noticed where people were sitting. At meals, particularly, people would suggest seating that
would allow two people to get to know each other, or make it easier for a threesome to hear
each other, etc. This sensitivity seemed to be a habit gained from practice.
291 Pranis, supra note 289, at 292.
292 Id. at 292–93.
293 In William Golding’s 1954 novel, Lord of the Flies, children marooned on an island and
first used a conch shell as a talking piece to permit everyone to speak without interruption.
As the social order breaks down, this procedural regularity becomes harder to maintain. It is
the rebels’ disrespect for the talking piece that first signals the breakdown in civilization
among the boys.
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 What is the appropriate process to involve stakeholders in an effort to put
things right?
 What are the needs of those who have been hurt?
 Whose obligations are these?294
Note the contrast between this very open-ended agenda, if one can even
call it that, and the tighter approach adopted by many mediators: issues, inter-
ests, options, proposals, agreement. Three of the five Restorative Justice ques-
tions have to do with procedural issues such as standing, cognizable interest,
and procedural rule setting. The substantive questions are about harm and
accountability.
Thus, in contrast to traditional disciplinary processes, restorative discipline
conferences would focus less on what rule has been broken, and more on what
harms have been done. Disciplinary outcomes from the conferences would
likely be less the product of the state’s rules or guidelines specifying the disci-
pline to be imposed for a certain category or severity of offense, and be more
the result of collaboration with the victim to determine the appropriate response
to what happened.
In some conferencing programs, a public official within an agency serves
as facilitator. For Restorative Discipline, we do not recommend that discipli-
nary counsel serve in this way. Instead, the attorney disciplinary agency should
develop a group of trained volunteers to serve as facilitators; this would allow
disciplinary counsel to be present as a party, representing a set of interests
distinct from the complainants or the respondents but clearly not neutral. If the
number of disciplinary conferences began to overwhelm the office of discipli-
nary counsel, the court could authorize the office to create a legion of deputy
disciplinary counsel, lawyers specially selected and trained to attend discipli-
nary conferences and represent the interests of the bar. The goals of deputy
disciplinary counsel would be to explain the profession’s view of the case and
ensure that the outcome of the conference is consistent with the interests of the
public and the bar.
Since facilitators play an important role throughout the proceedings, they
should be trained in understanding the needs of the parties and in conflict reso-
lution skills.295 For disciplinary conferencing, process expertise would be more
important than substantive expertise in the facilitator. The open ended approach
to identifying stakeholders would allow the conference to include any substan-
tive perspectives that might be relevant to the lawyer’s professional failure and
its effects. Disciplinary counsel (or one of her deputies) would be present, able
to ensure that any outcome of the conference is permissible within the frame-
work of the program, so it would not be necessary for the facilitator to bring
that expertise to the process.296 Because the facilitator would lack decision-
making authority and other stakeholders could represent the interests of the
294 ZEHR, supra note 134, at 38.
295 Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 216, at 74.
296 This structure also distinguishes disciplinary conferencing from victim-offender media-
tion in the criminal context, where some programs use trained, volunteer lay people to medi-
ate between offender and victims, and no one from the prosecutor’s office is present to
insure that the state’s interest is protected. See generally Brown, supra note 8 (describing the
various ways that victim-offender mediation programs can be structured and administered).
Spring 2012] THE PARADOX AND PROMISE 309
victim and of consumers generally, we could satisfy consumer advocates’ call
for greater lay participation in attorney discipline—even if most of the volun-
teer facilitators turn out to be lawyers. If the training and certification programs
for facilitators are open to qualified lawyers and non-lawyers, the agency could
counter the accusation that attorney discipline is stacked in favor of the profes-
sion and against consumers of legal services.
Before the conference itself, the facilitator would explain the process to all
of the parties so that they could be prepared to contribute to the conversation.
Most of this prep time would likely be spent with complainants and their sup-
port network, since they are the least likely to be repeat players or have any
familiarity with attorney discipline. Based on the pre-conference conversations,
the facilitator could also decide where people ought to sit in the circle. At the
conference, the facilitator would explain the process, go over ground rules, and
get the conversation started by calling upon someone to begin by telling their
story and perspective on what happened. Disciplinary counsel or her deputies
would be good choices to get things started, since they are not aligned with
either the complainant or the respondent and may be able to give everyone an
overview from the profession’s perspective. If a talking piece is used, the
facilitator could make sure that participants honor it by waiting their turn to
speak, and once the full circle has had a chance to speak, call upon participants
in follow up conversation. The facilitator’s tasks will obviously change depend-
ing upon the number and identity of the stakeholders. Some cases will be more
emotionally fraught than others and require more of the facilitator’s process
management. The participants would bring their own agendas to the conversa-
tion, and would each likely have one or two topics of most interest. The
facilitator, in contrast, would be asking the questions that would guide the par-
ticipants toward a restorative outcome: Who has been hurt? What are their
needs? Whose obligations are these?
If the facilitator and the participants are able to address those questions,
they may develop information that can be the basis for agreement about what
should be done. This should be a consensus-building process rather than a
majority vote, since the number of people present and expressing a particular
perspective on the case (e.g., the complainant’s family) does not necessarily
reflect the wisdom of outcomes they might propose. The state’s office of attor-
ney discipline will ultimately be responsible for the disposition of the case, so it
is most desirable for disciplinary counsel to be a part of the consensus that
forms in the conference.
c. Case Selection for Conferencing
We propose that conferencing could be a substitute for discipline at minor
offense levels and a supplement to discipline at more serious levels of offense.
d. Voluntary v. Mandatory Participation
Any diversionary program faces issues about whether to make participa-
tion compulsory or voluntary, and whether to treat victims differently from
offenders on this point. Disciplinary counsel might say to complainants, “If you
want this to go forward you have to participate in the conference; otherwise it
310 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:253
will likely be dismissed or this minor discipline will be imposed.” This is a
“choice” that might feel rather restricted from the complainant’s perspective.
Similarly, disciplinary counsel might say to respondents, “You have to go to
the conference and participate in good faith, otherwise your discipline will be
x+1” (where x is the expected discipline that would be imposed if the case were
just adjudicated at a grievance hearing). This would help to mitigate the gaming
that respondents engage in when calculating whether moving forward with a
formal investigation may prove easier in the end. The problem from discipli-
nary counsel’s perspective is that the formal discipline likely to be imposed
may be difficult to predict without the benefit of the information developed in a
hearing. Perhaps this suggests that disciplinary counsel be empowered to
threaten uncooperative respondents with discipline of “x+1” where x is the dis-
cipline that would be imposed assuming all of the complainant’s allegations
were true. Participation in the conferencing would be nominally voluntary, but
with a very coercive feel from the respondent’s perspective.
e. Requiring an Admission of Guilt
Should disciplinary conference occur only if the respondent admits guilt?
Braithwaite and Mugford argue that even if a restorative practice is “firmly
grounded in the theory of legal pluralism, certain basic procedural rules cannot
be trumped.”297 The most important of these, they explain, is that “if the
offender denies committing the alleged offense, she has the right to terminate
the conference, demanding that the facts be tried in a court of law.”298 This
does not require that the offender plead guilty in order to participate—only that
the offender chooses “not to deny” the charges. A similar “does not deny”
approach could be used in disciplinary cases.
f. Application
With this framework in mind, we can envision how a restorative discipline
approach may lead to a more satisfactory process for and resolution of Taylor’s
complaint against Wilson. A trained volunteer facilitator may convene a con-
ference to include Taylor and his business associates, Wilson and his office
supporters, disciplinary counsel, and any other relevant stakeholders who
become apparent during pre-conference discussions. During the conference,
with the use of a talking piece, Taylor will have the opportunity to share his
frustration and to explain the negative effects that Wilson’s inaction had on
Taylor’s small business. Wilson will have the opportunity to explain why Tay-
lor’s case slipped through the cracks and will see firsthand the impacts of his
neglect. Confronted with the pain he caused, Wilson may express genuine
remorse and may apologize instead of glossing over his “minor misconduct.”
Together, the stakeholders will learn from each perspective presented and may
be able to reach a consensus on how Taylor will be refunded and on how Wil-
son—with the help of his support system—will improve his office procedures
to ensure such client neglect does not occur again. The conference should help
to restore the relationships between the parties, the parties’ trust in the legal
297 Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 281, at 159.
298 Id. at 159–60.
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system, and Wilson’s ability to exhibit the qualities that are expressed in the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
III. RISKS, BENEFITS, AND OPEN ISSUES
We recognize that several concerns or objections might be raised to our
proposal. This section will summarize some of them briefly. Few of these can
be addressed or resolved fully in theory; time and practice will show whether
the risks of Restorative Discipline outweigh its potential benefits.
Perhaps the most fundamental objection to restorative attorney discipline
stems from a general critique of Restorative Justice: it leverages the public
interest for private gain. One of us has explored this concern in some detail
before, objecting to programs that use the threat of criminal prosecution to
coerce a settlement in cases that might otherwise be characterized as torts and
relegated to the civil system.299 In the context of attorney discipline, the con-
cern would be that the bar gives up too much control to victims and other
stakeholders, possibly compromising the public’s interest in lawyers and their
ethical regulation. Does having a neutral facilitator take too much power from
disciplinary counsel? We think it unlikely, because in our model, disciplinary
counsel or an appropriately deputized individual will be present at the confer-
ence to assert the bar’s interests.
A related objection might be that the privacy of restorative discipline
could allow disciplinary authorities and/or victims to run roughshod over attor-
neys in ways that the public would not support. Given the variety of stakehold-
ers participating in a restorative disciplinary conference, however, we think it
likely that neither the offending attorney nor the complaining client will be able
to hijack the proceedings at the expense of other interests.300
Concerns for the integrity of the public interest in criminal cases have
generated sound responses from proponents of Restorative Justice. If the rules
and procedures governing restorative discipline require that the lawyer admit
guilt prior to entering restorative disciplinary proceedings, the more
prosecutorial aspects of attorney regulation will safeguard the public interest in
regulating unethical lawyers. In this way, as Steve Garvey has put it, law can
“form bookends, so to speak, around restorative justice.”301
Those bookends in turn provide a response to an additional question about
restorative discipline, which is what ought to happen if the grieved lawyer fails
to repent or the victim fails to “forgive” and agree to the attorney’s offer of
reparation? Garvey envisions a relationship between restorative practices and
ordinary legal proceedings that provides a safety net for such situations. In
299 See generally Brown, supra note 8.
300 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 399 (“[C]riminal justice officials who abuse their
power face greater risk in a circle than in a courtroom. And of course the accountability of
the courtroom is not removed in restorative justice. It remains standing above the restorative
justice conference should there be an alleged abuse of process or outcome that causes some
participants to refuse to sign an agreement or a prosecutor to contest it.”). See generally
DECLAN ROCHE, ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2003).
301 Garvey, Restorative Justice, supra note 145, at 316; see also Antony Duff, Restoration
and Retribution, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECON-
CILABLE PARADIGMS? 43, 56–57 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).
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Garvey’s view, if an offender fails to repent, the state steps in to punish; if a
victim fails to forgive, the state steps in to reintegrate (since a state cannot
forgive on a victim’s behalf).302
A contrary critique of Restorative Justice that might apply to our proposal
is not that it unduly dilutes the regulatory power of the state, but just the oppo-
site: that such proceedings “expand the net of social control.”303 The concern is
that less formal processes will allow the state to impose punishment in a larger
group of cases than it would have if it had to try the cases through formal
processes in court. This should not be a concern in attorney disciplinary cases
since, in contrast to criminal contexts, attorneys have taken affirmative steps to
avow the rules of professional conduct and subject themselves to discipline if
they should violate those rules.
Some critics may question whether Restorative Justice, developed prima-
rily in the context of juvenile justice, can make the transition into contexts
serving adult offenders. As John Braithwaite has noted, however, “the idea that
shaming and reintegration ceremonies are valuable only for the young is not
well founded,” and “preliminary qualitative evidence indicates that it may be
extremely valuable for individuals well into middle age.”304
A final concern worth mentioning is that restorative practices may exacer-
bate gender inequalities. John Braithwaite has observed that “there seems little
doubt that women do more of the restoring than men in restorative justice
processes.”305 He therefore worries that “[t]he price tag for communitarian
empowerment (which most women say they want in all the interview-based
research) is a gendered burden of care.”306 Of course, it is not obvious that
restorative practice in the context of a professional relationship would exhibit
the same dynamics as researchers see in criminal or family contexts. Still, pro-
gram administrators could address this concern preemptively through training,
alerting facilitators to the potential for this gender inequality. After the fact,
administrators could also conduct quality control research, keeping track of
participants’ genders and the results that emerge from their proceedings to
detect any patterns reflecting a greater burden on female lawyers or clients.
IV. CONCLUSION: RESTORATIVE DISCIPLINE AND THE NURTURE
OF COMMUNITY
Restorative Justice Theory gains greater coherence and relevance when
one can point to a community whose norms are at stake in, and may be rein-
forced by, the process of dispute resolution at issue. Restorative Justice Theory
only makes sense in lawyer discipline if we can credibly claim the legal profes-
sion as a “community.”
302 Garvey, Restorative Justice, supra note 145, at 316.
303 Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 281, at 160 (“Given a commitment to flexibility and
participant empowerment, one central concern is the prospect of standardization and rou-
tinization. It would be easy for ceremonies to be converted into Foucauldian ‘discipline’,
extending the net of state control.”).
304 Id. at 152.
305 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 154.
306 Id.
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This raises important questions about the definition and practice of com-
munity. As Richard Schragger has written:
[I]n deciding whether a particular community’s norm is entitled to respect, we are
deciding both whether the community exists and who gets to be included within
it. . . . Before one can assert local autonomy in the name of community, one needs a
theory of insiders and outsiders that justifies the exercise of autonomy in its name.307
Howard Zehr, a foundational thinker in Restorative Justice Theory, warns that
we should not be too quick to conclude that community exists. “The issue is
particularly a problem in cultures where traditional communities have eroded,
as is true in much of the United States. Furthermore, ‘community’ can be too
abstract a concept to be useful. And a community can be guilty of abuses.”308
Richard Schragger offers a “contractarian” theory of community as “a
product of individual acts of voluntary association, an outcome of individuals
who have consented to join in a group.”309 The contractarian theory supports
our view of the legal profession as a community. In our view, lawyers are part
of a community that is neither geographically nor professionally bound, but
cuts across these lines to recognize the interactions, relationships, and interde-
pendencies that are hallmarks of community. When lawyers interact with cli-
ents, third parties, court systems, and other entities in the context of legal
problems or questions, the law creates a set of community norms that can
coherently be brought to bear in case of professional failure or ethical viola-
tions by the lawyers.
But Schragger also offers what he calls a “deep account of commu-
nity,”310 and this too supports our conception of the legal profession as a com-
munity that can provide coherent norms to guide restorative processes.
Schragger says, “The deep account of community reverses the direction of indi-
vidual and community. It rejects the idea that the individual can exist or be
sustained outside of, and prior to, his or her relationships with others, prior to a
community that infuses individual choices and experiences with meaning.”311
In our legal system, the bar truly can be said to preexist the individual lawyer,
while rules of professional conduct preexist and govern the individual attorney-
client relationship. Over the years courts and legislatures have respected the
right of the bar both to articulate its own professional norms and enforce those
norms through disciplinary processes.312 A lawyer derives her identity and
capabilities from the definition of her role provided by the profession. It is the
bar—interacting with individual clients and with governmental institutions—
that infuses lawyers’ “individual choices and experiences with meaning.”
307 Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 374 (2001).
308 ZEHR, supra note 134, at 27.
309 Schragger, supra note 307, at 387.
310 Id. at 393.
311 Id.
312 These professional rules may differ from parallel civil and criminal provisions, and a
single incident may give rise to processes in the civil, criminal, and disciplinary systems—
each with a different goal and thus a different result.
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Moreover, it should be easy to see the legal profession as a community
because of the many things it does to define “insiders and outsiders”:
 The bar exam and “character and fitness” inquiries control entry to the
profession.
 Legal education inculcates shared competencies and values in the people
who would join.
 Bar associations foster connection and maintain collegiality.
 Rules of professional conduct set forth behavioral norms that are peculiar to
the profession.
 Disciplinary processes maintain ongoing quality control.
In some places, it is true, people in the profession do not know each other;
anonymity dilutes the sense of community and mutual care that may have typi-
fied the profession in the past. But in many places, or at least in pockets of the
profession even in the largest, most anonymous of cities, groups of lawyers
know each other well and interact frequently. Sometimes they are competitors,
but surely competition is not inconsistent with the formation of community.
And whether or not they know each other personally, lawyers who join the bar
of a state can be said to have voluntarily associated with the lawyers of that
state.
If we are a community, how do we respond when one of us wrongs
another?313 Our argument here is that we should respond with an eye toward
the harm that has been caused, and include in our range of vision those who
often stand on the periphery of existing disciplinary systems. By making the
disciplinary process more inclusive of victim perspectives and more open to
participation by multiple stake holders, attorney discipline can demonstrate and
foster the professional qualities that it seeks to enforce.
313 See Garvey, Atonement, supra note 270, at 1802 (“[W]hat model of punishment, if any,
operates in an ideal community?”).
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APPENDIX A
After a grievance complaint has been filed, the contents are reviewed by
disciplinary counsel, a private attorney appointed by the court to perform all
prosecutorial functions in the disciplinary system.314 If the complaint suffi-
ciently alleges misconduct or incapacity, disciplinary counsel conducts an
investigation.315 After investigating, if disciplinary counsel finds probable
cause to believe that the allegations are true, she may recommend probation,
admonition, or the filing of formal charges with the state’s disciplinary board,
to be adjudicated by a local hearing committee.316 A copy of the charge is sent
to the respondent attorney, who has a specified number of days to file an
answer with both the committee and with disciplinary counsel.317 Thereafter, a
hearing date is set. The respondent has the right to be represented by counsel, to
present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing.318 The com-
plainant has “the right to make a statement to the [hearing committee] . . .
concerning the respondent’s alleged misconduct and the effect of the alleged
misconduct on the complainant.”319 After the hearing, the committee makes its
decision and serves its report on both the disciplinary counsel and the respon-
dent.320 Although the hearing is public, the deliberations of the hearing com-
mittee are not.321 Appellate review is limited.322 Any time a hearing committee
or review board recommends suspension or disbarment, the hearing commit-
tee’s report is sent to the court for review at its discretion.323
314 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 4 (2002).
315 Id. R. 11(A).
316 Id. R. 11(B). Note that states differ on the composition of these ethics review boards,
with some requiring significant lay participation, others allowing lawyers to control the
boards and the hearings; see 2006 Lawyer Discipline Report Card, supra note 6 (“On most
hearing panels just one out of every three members is a non-lawyer. Six states—California,
Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina and Tennessee—do not allow a single layper-
son to hear evidence in disciplinary proceedings. Idaho is the only jurisdiction in the country
where non-lawyers comprise the majority on hearing committees.”).
317 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(D)(2)-(3).
318 Id. R. 11(D)(4).
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. R. 16(C).
322 Id. R. 11(E).
323 Id.
